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This Article, drawing on heretofore unexplored historical sources, examines the
Supreme Court’s role in the development of these divergent approaches to the use of
race in the affirmative action and family law contexts. As those sources demonstrate,
the Court has—over the last forty years—had numerous opportunities to address the
growing divide. Nevertheless, the Court (and particularly some of its most ardent
affirmative action detractors) has historically been reluctant to do so, at least in part
because of a normative endorsement of the race-based practices at issue in the
family law context. Thus, the Court has avoided cases involving the use of race in
family law—and taken other steps to limit the reach of its doctrine in the family
law arena—based on a perception that remaining uses of race in the family are
fundamentally different, and at least in some contexts, benign.
This history has profound implications for the Court’s broader race law jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has—at least facially—rejected the possibility of a
role for contextual or normative factors in its application of equal protection
doctrine to race. Instead, the Court has demanded that race-based classifications—
no matter what their intent or effects—be subjected to strict scrutiny. But the history
of the Court’s approach to family law strongly suggests that the Court itself does in
fact weigh such considerations in its approach to taking up and adjudicating race
law claims. This Article suggests that there are serious process, legitimacy, and
substantive concerns raised by such a divergence between the Court’s formal
doctrine and its practice, and discusses alternatives for aligning the two more fully.
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INTRODUCTION
By all accounts, the colorblindness revolution has arrived. Since City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,1 Supreme Court majorities have proclaimed the
Court’s obligation to subject all uses of race to the “most rigid scrutiny.”2
1
2

488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (quoting Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419
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Thus, the Court’s ostensible command has been that even programs intended
to benefit minority group members—such as affirmative action—must be
subjected to the same constitutional regime as undoubtedly invidious uses
of race. Undergirding this approach have been empirical and moral claims of
the necessity of consistency in treating all uses of race as inherently suspect.3 Scholars have reinforced this account, contending that the Supreme
Court has fundamentally turned away from a contextually variable approach
to race to one in which all uses of race are treated as presumptively malign.4
But the colorblindness revolution’s reported rise has been at least partially apocryphal. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the courts do not
strictly scrutinize all government uses of race. Indeed, colorblindness
doctrine has—despite its sweeping rhetoric—failed to reach a wide array of
racial domains.5 As a result, many putatively benign government uses of
(2013); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003); Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493-95 (1989) (plurality
opinion); id., 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
3 See, e.g., Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418; id., 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring); Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 721, 745-48 (2007); id., 551
U.S. at 751-52, 758, 778-82 (Thomas, J., concurring); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-24, 229, 236; id., 515
U.S. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993); Croson, 488 U.S.
at 493-94; id., 488 U.S. at 521, 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
4 See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 985 (2007); Reginald Oh, Discrimination and Distrust: A Critical
Linguistic Analysis of the Discrimination Concept, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 837, 861 (2005); see also
Ariela J. Gross, From the Streets to the Courts: Doing Grassroots Legal History of the Civil Rights Era, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1233, 1250-51 (2012) (reviewing TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO
DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2010)).
But cf. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 25-28 (2003) (arguing that, in reality, assessments of
what will count as a “classification” in equal protection doctrine are informed by other widely
shared normative values); R. Richard Banks, The Benign–Invidious Asymmetry in Equal Protection
Analysis, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 573, 574-75 (2003) (arguing that “[e]ven seemingly stalwart
defenders of a symmetrical nondiscrimination mandate may, in practice, support the very sort of
asymmetry they purport to oppose”).
5 The acontextual colorblindness doctrine developed in the Court’s affirmative action cases
has been extended only to a limited number of contexts outside of affirmative action, most notably
to race-based primary school assignments and to race-based redistricting. See PICS, 551 U.S. at
720; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904-05 (1995). But cf. infra note 289 and accompanying text
(noting that the Court has not always applied the same gatekeeping standards even in those
contexts to which it has purportedly extended its affirmative action precedents). There are many
other areas to which colorblindness doctrine has not been extended robustly, including family law,
non-racially classifying but race-intentional government programs, recordkeeping, race-based
suspect selection, and others. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 4, at 16-18 (describing other contexts
in which the courts have declined to extend strict scrutiny, including the census and race-based
suspect descriptions); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 939-940 (2006) [hereinafter Balkin & Siegel, Principles] (listing racial data
collection and recordkeeping); Banks, supra note 4, at 579 (noting that lower courts have declined
to apply strict scrutiny to race-intentional but not racially classifying government actions); R.
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race have continued to be ubiquitous—and largely constitutionally unchallenged—long past the announcement of the Court’s stringent and ostensibly
global approach to contemporary uses of race. And, while the partialness of
the colorblindness revolution is perhaps most vividly apparent in the lower
courts, it has been far from restricted to that context. Thus, the Supreme
Court itself has—through docket management and more direct means—
declined to fully embrace the implications of its colorblindness revolution.6
This Article tells the story of one of the most persistent and striking
contexts in which the “colorblindness revolution” has been more illusory
than real: the use of race in family law.7 Beginning with the aftermath of
Loving v. Virginia,8 a decision often canonized as the endpoint of race-based
family law rules,9 it traces the courts’ generally permissive response to
remaining official uses of race in the family during the following half
Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse,
48 UCLA L. REV. 1075 (2001) [hereinafter Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection] (providing an
extended treatment of race-based suspect selection); R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire:
Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875,
904-08 (1998) [hereinafter Banks, Color of Desire] (same, listing legislative districting, criminal
profiles, adoption, and recordkeeping); R. Richard Banks, The Illusion of Colorblindness in
Antidiscrimination Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Banks,
Colorblindness] (listing race-based suspect profiles, facilitative accommodation in adoption, and
racial casting); infra Parts I–V (detailing the courts’ constitutionally permissive approach to
contemporary uses of race in family law).
6 Supra note 5; see also Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (denying certiorari in a case exempting race-based suspect selection
from equal protection scrutiny); Brown v. City of Oneanta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 816 (2001) (same).
7 In the interest of space, there is one major omission from my discussion of this subject.
Specifically, with the exception of the case of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013), I
have not taken up the distinct constitutional issues presented by the use of race or heritage in
family law determinations involving Native American children, or the statutory scheme that
governs such uses, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The constitutional issues presented in
this context are analytically distinct in light of the Court’s historic treatment of classifications
based on Indian status as political, rather than racial. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-53
(1973). Thus, while there are both political and legal interrelationships between the historical
approach to custody and adoptive placement of Native American children and the approach taken
vis-à-vis other minority children, a full discussion of this issue exceeds the scope of this Article.
See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES 480-518 (2003) (addressing this issue
separately for similar reasons).
Leaving aside the Native American context, the majority of the discourse and practice around
the contemporary use of race in the family law context has focused on black or black-biracial
children. Thus, while I do not exclude from my discussion cases dealing with other minority
children (or, on rare occasions, Caucasian children), my discussion is most salient to and typified
by agency and judicial practice vis-à-vis black and black-biracial children.
8 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
9 Mark Rahdert, Transracial Adoption—A Constitutional Perspective, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1687,
1690 (1995).
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century. As this exploration reveals, the use of race in the family has
remained robust in the post-Loving era, with many state agencies and courts
continuing to apply race-based rules in the adoption, foster care, and
custody contexts.10 Constitutional challenges to these race-based actions have
generally fared poorly, with courts typically (albeit not always) applying de
minimis constitutional scrutiny. Thus, during the same time frame that the
Supreme Court has increasingly proclaimed the need to strictly scrutinize
all government uses of race, family law has remained a bastion of racial
permissiveness.
This divergence has—unsurprisingly—not gone unremarked in the legal
literature. Indeed, a number of scholars have argued for the erroneousness
of the lower courts’ approach to contemporary uses of race in family law (or
the unconstitutionality of such racial policies themselves), contending that
the Court’s contemporary affirmative action jurisprudence demands the
application of strict scrutiny, and that this high bar is one that contemporary
uses of race in the family are unable to meet.11 According to these scholars,
the lower courts’ approach to the use of race in the family has fundamentally
diverged from the Supreme Court’s race law jurisprudence and should be
brought in line with contemporary affirmative action jurisprudence. Thus,
the story that has been told by contemporary scholars is primarily one of
lower court disobedience—one in which the lower courts have failed to act
as faithful implementers of the Supreme Court’s colorblindness revolution—and not one which calls into question the dominant narrative of the
Court’s own jurisprudence.
But there is a profoundly different story to be told regarding the contemporary history of race in family law. As archival Supreme Court documents
reveal, far from diverging from the Supreme Court’s intended approach to
the use of race in family law, it appears that the Court itself—and particularly

10 While Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984), struck down one particular use of race in
child custody in the mid-1980s (i.e., the practice of removing custody based on a parent’s
interracial marriage), it did little to disrupt continuing uses of race outside of that specific context,
including uses of race in adoption, foster care, and interracial parent custody disputes. See infra
Parts II–III.
11 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching
in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991); David Meyer, Lecture, Palmore Comes of Age: The
Place of Race in the Placement of Children, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 183, 185-87 (2007);
Davidson Pattiz, Racial Preference in Adoption: An Equal Protection Challenge, 82 GEO. L.J. 2571
(1994); David Rottenstein, Trans-Racial Adoption and the Statutory Preference Schemes: Before the
“Best Interests” and After the “Melting Pot,” 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 137 (1994). For a divergent
perspective, see Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and
Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 33 (1993–1994).
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its race conservatives12—have deliberately shielded continued uses of race in
the family law context from rigorous constitutional scrutiny. Thus, although
the Court in Palmore v. Sidoti did take up one contemporary instantiation of
the use of race in family law (the practice of depriving a parent of custody
based on a post-divorce interracial marriage), it acted carefully in crafting
its opinion to ensure that it would not inhibit other continuing uses of race
in the family (including especially adoption).13 And when the lower courts,
in response, read Palmore narrowly and continued to decline to apply strict
scrutiny review, the Court repeatedly declined invitations to revisit the
balance struck in Palmore, based at least in part on the Court’s race conservatives’ perception that the remaining uses of race in family law were
simply “different” and, at least in some circumstances, “benign.”14
Nor was the tension between the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence and the lower courts’ permissive approach to race in family law
simply lost on the Justices during this time. Since the very beginning of the
Court’s modern foray into the affirmative action context, parallels between
affirmative action and contemporary uses of race in the family law context—
12 This Article uses the terms “race conservatives,” “race moderates,” and “race liberals” as a
shorthand for the array of positions that have been taken by the Justices in the affirmative action
context vis-à-vis the appropriateness of considering contextual factors (such as whether a
particular use of race is “benign”) in determining whether strict scrutiny applies. Although there
are other axes on which one might divide the Justices into categories, for the purposes of this
Article, endorsement of full strict scrutiny review (without consideration of normative or other
contextual factors) was selected as the most pertinent divide. Thus, Justices who, during the
historical time period at issue, clearly expressed (internally or externally) the view that full strict
scrutiny should be applied even to putatively benign uses of race, such as affirmative action, are
characterized as “race conservatives.” Those who expressed the view that a more flexible or relaxed
regime should apply are characterized as “race liberals.” And those who were either inconsistent (at
that time) or who were ambiguous as to their position are characterized as “race moderates.” I
borrow this helpful trichotomy (with a number of modifications) from Reva Siegel’s work but
recognize that these shorthand terms may oversimplify the range of positions that the Justices
have taken vis-à-vis these issues over time. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1282 (2011)
[hereinafter Siegel, Antibalkanization].
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Parts III–IV. The Court has declined to take up challenges to race-based family
law practices in a number of cases. See, e.g., J.H.H. v. O’Hara, 878 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990); Gambla v. Gambla, 853 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied,
552 U.S. 810 (2007); Wilson v. Darrow (Ky. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990); In re
Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d 1036 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
809 (1995); In re Welfare of D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1000 (1992);
Carlson v. County of Hennepin, 428 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1023 (1989); see also Memorandum from J.B., Law Clerk, on No. 90-123-CX, Wilson v. Darrow, to
the Cert Pool 3-4 (Aug. 10, 1990) (on file with Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth,
The Digitial Archive of the Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun (2007), http://epstein.usc.edu/
research/BlackmunArchive.html [hereinafter Blackmun Digital Archive]).
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their characterization as benign, their putative benefits for minority15 group
members—were repeatedly called to the Court’s attention. Thus, both
litigants and the Justices’ own law clerks have repeatedly highlighted for the
Justices the doctrinal and logical overlaps between race-based family law
adjudication and affirmative action jurisprudence. And, indeed, even where
others have not explicitly pointed out such overlaps, the Justices themselves
have done so sua sponte, identifying doctrinal overlaps between affirmative
action and family law in their internal communications.
Unearthing this rich history has a number of important implications.16
Most significantly, exploring the constitutional history of race-based family
law rules at the Supreme Court level exposes the ways in which the Court
has—sub rosa—profoundly diverged from its claimed colorblindness
project. Thus, the Court has claimed to reject the possibility that particular
uses of race might be exempted from stringent constitutional scrutiny—on
the reasoning that uses of race by the government are inherently malign—
while simultaneously taking a deferential approach to other (non-affirmative
action) uses of race.17 Indeed, it appears that certain family law uses of race—
including particularly race-matching in adoption—have been deliberately
shielded from strict scrutiny based on the perception that they are fundamentally “different” and—unlike affirmative action—potentially benign.
Thus, while the Court has facially claimed to adhere to a rule rejecting the

15 Most (but not all) of the cases described herein arose in the context of family law decisionmaking vis-à-vis black or black-biracial children. See supra note 7. Thus, although I use the global
term “minority” to include the limited case law that has arisen outside of that context (and outside
of the Native American context, omitted from full discussion herein), the majority of cases
described herein involved black or black-biracial children, a factor that may have been salient to
the courts’ decisionmaking. Cf. infra note 260 (discussing the historical tendency to essentialize
individuals with relatively minimal Native American heritage as white, while essentializing those
with any African American heritage as black).
16 One important implication, which I do not discuss here, is that this history further substantiates the robust scholarly consensus that family law is often treated as “exceptional,” and thus
not subject to normal doctrinal rules, by the courts. See, e.g., JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY
LAW REIMAGINED: RECASTING THE CANON (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 3) (on file
with author) (describing family law exceptionalism as the “premise that family law rejects what the
law otherwise does, and does what the law otherwise rejects”). See generally Janet Halley & Kerry
Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family
Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010) (introduction to a special journal issue
dedicated to Family Law Exceptionalism). Indeed, it appears that civil rights is a robust area for
family law exceptionalism, with civil rights doctrines often being disregarded—or only partially
incorporated—in the family law context. This Article is a part of a broader project investigating
the manifestations and causes of family law exceptionalism in the civil rights context, other
portions of which aim to more fully situate civil rights family law exceptionalism within the
broader family law exceptionalism literature.
17 See infra Part VI.
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salience of contextual factors in determining the level of constitutional
scrutiny to be applied, it has, in practice, looked precisely to such factors as
a basis for exempting particular uses of race from rigorous constitutional
review.
This discordance between the Court’s articulated standard for constitutional race adjudication and its actual approach raises profound concerns.
Among other things, by formally denying the salience of racial classifications’ contextual underpinnings (while attending to them sub rosa), the
Court has deprived litigants of the opportunity to influence its choice of
how contextual factors matter, and thus to influence its ultimate determination of whether and where to rigorously enforce stringent standards of
constitutional review. Moreover, such an undercover approach—by necessity
unguided by fixed legal standards—must necessarily rest on precisely the
type of intuitive, instinctive judgments about race (and about which uses of
race have value) that troublingly echo America’s recent constitutional past.
Finally, the Court’s formal adoption of a rule that does not accurately reflect
its true decisionmaking criteria can only lead to distortions in its substantive doctrine, insofar as the Court will find it increasingly difficult to avoid
the more radical implications of its own pronouncements.
The modern history of race in family law thus calls for a reevaluation of
the absence of an explicit place for contextual and normative considerations
in contemporary race law jurisprudence.18 If, indeed, the Court is engaging
sub silentio in the practice of shielding certain racial practices from rigorous
constitutional scrutiny based on context-specific concerns, there are strong
reasons why the process by which the Court does so should be unobscured
and made a part of the formal framework of equal protection doctrine.19
While it is not clear that such formal recognition of contextual variability
would result in a reversal of the Court’s affirmative action doctrine at this
juncture (and, indeed, the Court might well adhere to its view that all
affirmative action programs must uniformly be strictly scrutinized), the
benefits of such doctrinal “truth in advertising” would nevertheless (for all
the reasons adverted to above) be profound. Thus, the history of race in
family law strongly suggests that the time has come to reconsider the
Court’s decades-old rejection of the notion that normative and contextual
considerations matter to race law adjudication.

18 Cf. Banks, supra note 4, at 574 (discussing the formal absence of a “Benign–Invidious
Asymmetry” in equal protection doctrine and suggesting that courts in fact deploy common sense
intuitions about what uses of race are benign, despite their formal rejection of such an approach).
19 See infra Part VI.
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This Article takes up the foregoing issues as follows: Part I (1967–1978)
traces the constitutional treatment of race-based family law practices during
the immediate post-Loving era and explores the initial emergence of a divide
in the Court’s approach to uses of race in the affirmative action and family
law contexts. Part II (1979–1984) turns to a discussion of Palmore v. Sidoti
and the substantial internal debates that Palmore prompted (despite its
ultimate unanimity) regarding remaining instantiations of race in family
law. This Part shows that Palmore was controversial in part precisely because
of its potential implications for other contemporary uses of race in family
law (including particularly race-matching in adoption) and the desire of a
number of the Justices to leave race-matching in adoption undisturbed.
Part III (1985–1995) explores the very profound divergence that occurred
in the post-Palmore period between the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence (where the Court increasingly demanded that all uses of race be
strictly scrutinized) and the lower courts’ approach to race in family law
(where the courts most often declined to apply any meaningful constitutional
scrutiny to continuing uses of race). This Part further traces these lower
court family law decisions to the petition for certiorari stage, where they
were repeatedly rejected by the Court, even where the affirmative action–
family law divide was squarely raised. Part IV (1996–2007) continues to
follow this divergence through the contemporary era and discusses the
Court’s continued failure to address even the most clear divergences from
its ostensible demand of strict scrutiny in the family law context. Part V, in
Epilogue, takes up the recently decided case of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
and addresses the Court’s continued failure—nearly half a century after
Loving—to meaningfully address the affirmative action–family law divide.
Part VI turns at last to the implications of this rich history for the
Court’s race law jurisprudence. Drawing together the historical materials
explored in Parts I–V, this Part discusses the ways in which the Court’s
publicly articulated rhetoric (rejecting the possibility of lesser constitutional
scrutiny for particular uses of race) has failed to reflect its internal actions
(facilitating precisely such a regime in the family law arena). Part VI then
discusses the profound concerns this divergence raises, including the
legitimacy and process defects it creates. Finally, this Part explores potential
ways that the Court’s race law doctrine might be rendered consistent with
its practices, including the reintroduction in the Court’s formal equal
protection doctrine of a place for contextually and normatively based
variations in the applicable standard of review.
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I. RACE IN THE FAMILY FROM LOVING TO DRUMMOND: 1967–1978
The years following the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia
marked the high point for the constitutional invalidation of race-based
decisionmaking in family law. During the five years following Loving, eight
lower courts, many within the Deep South, invalidated race-based family
law restrictions on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.20 And while many of
these cases can be characterized as tying up the loose ends of Loving—
invalidating antimiscegenation laws in response to the intransigence of local
officials—others reached more broadly, constitutionally invalidating statutory
restrictions on transracial adoption and relying on Loving to open up
inheritance rights to the relatives of interracial couples. Thus, the five-year
period between 1967 and 1972 can fairly be characterized as the most activist
time frame in history for the courts’ adjudication of constitutional racebased family law claims.
By the mid-1970s, however, this unified approach had begun to dissolve
in the face of broader political and legal developments. Politically, the late
1960s and early 1970s witnessed a major transformation in the discourse
around race equality as the black power and cultural nationalism movements
gained national prominence.21 These movements, which called for the
celebration and preservation of black difference (and often directly for racial
separatism), meant that for the first time minority voices became prominent
20 See Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972) (striking down ban on interracial adoption as a violation of equal protection); United States v. Brittain, 319 F. Supp. 1058
(N.D. Ala. 1970) (overturning Alabama miscegenation bans); Davis v. Ashford, 2 Race Rel. L.
Surv. 152 (S.D. Miss. 1970) (invalidating a Mississippi statute banning miscegenation); Davis v.
Gately, 269 F. Supp. 996 (D. Del. 1967) (invalidating Delaware’s criminal and civil antimiscegenation statutes); Van Hook v. Blanton, 206 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1968) (per curiam) (declaring Florida’s
antimiscegenation laws invalid); Hibbert v. Mudd, 272 So. 2d 697 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (noting that
the lower court had relied on Loving to invalidate a law that banned miscegenous heirs from
receiving their inheritance), rev’d on other grounds, 294 So. 2d 518 (La. 1974); Dick v. Reaves, 434
P.2d 295 (Okla. 1967) (in the context of an inheritance dispute, invalidating Oklahoma’s antimiscegenation law); In re Adoption of Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (per curiam)
(finding ban on interracial adoption to be unconstitutional). But cf. Vetrano v. Gardner, 290 F.
Supp. 200 (N.D. Miss. 1968) (denying social security benefits to children of an interracial couple
because their parents were unmarried, and rejecting a constitutional challenge to same despite the
fact that interracial marriage was unlawful in the jurisdiction in which the parents lived during the
relevant time frame). In contrast, during the five-year period preceding Loving, not a single lower
court invalidated a race-based family law policy on constitutional grounds.
21 See generally Lloren A. Foster, Black Power Movement, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN HISTORY: 1896 TO THE PRESENT (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006); THOMAS J.
SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE NORTH (2008); Lisa Corrigan, Reimagining Black Power: Prison Manifestos and the
Strategies of Regeneration in the Rewriting of Black Identity, 1969–2002 (2006) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland) (on file with author).
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in promoting race’s salience in family law decisionmaking.22 Indeed, by the
early to mid-1970s, the most vocal advocates of official restrictions on
interracial family formation tended to be minority organizations, such as the
National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW).23 Noting the
unique needs of minority children, such organizations argued strongly
against interracial adoptive and foster care placements, contending that
nonminority parents were not competent to instill a healthy sense of racial
identity in black or biracial children.24
Legally, the early 1970s also witnessed major transformations in the form
of racial restrictions in family law. By 1973, most Jim Crow–era statutes
categorically precluding interracial intimacy and family formation had been
struck down or repealed.25 The policies that remained—many of which were
22 See supra note 21 and infra note 24; cf. Susan J. Grossman, A Child of a Different Color: Race
as a Factor in Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 303, 331-32 (1967–1968) (describing then-existing arguments for race-matching in custody and adoption law, which derived
predominantly from traditional adoption practices promoting the appearance of a “natural” family
and from Jim Crow–era disapproval of race mixing). For an early decision that was particularly
explicit in drawing on black power political concepts, see In re B. Children, 89 Misc. 2d 493 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1977) (finding that a black child was “entitled to his ‘Black Pride’” and thus should be
returned to the home of his biological parents rather than remaining with his white foster
parents).
23 KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 111-12, 393-98; Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1179-82. During this
same time frame, Indian organizations, such as the Association on Indian Affairs, were also
increasingly agitating for restrictions on the placement of Indian children with non-Indian
families. See, e.g., Thalia Gonzalez, Reclaiming the Promise of the Indian Child Welfare Act: A Study of
State Incorporation and Adoption of Legal Protections for Indian Status Offenders, 42 N.M. L. REV. 131,
139-40 (2012) (chronicling the advocacy leading to the enactment of the ICWA); see also Maria E.
Camposeco, Bright Hopes, Shared Heritage: Helping Latino Kids Find Roots when Adopted, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 8, 1992, at B1 (noting the decades-long opposition of both the NABSW and the
Indian community to placing black or Indian children with white families). These efforts
ultimately culminated in the successful enactment of the ICWA, a federal statute that requires the
placement of Indian children in Indian homes in many circumstances. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-23
(2006); see also Gonzalez, supra, at 140-41 (describing the protections afforded by the ICWA). The
ICWA has, in turn, provided a template for calls for similar legislation vis-à-vis African American
and other minority children. See, e.g., Jessica Dixon, The African-American Child Welfare Act: A
Legal Redress for African-American Disproportionality in Child Protection Cases, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.AM. L. & POL’Y 109, 112-113, 125-126 (2008) (arguing for an “African-American Child Welfare
Act” modeled on the ICWA).
24 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 393-98; Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1179-82 (discussing
the opposition by NABSW and others to transracial adoption in the early 1970s). These sentiments
would eventually come to be significantly reflected in the case law. For an interesting and nuanced
treatment of the issues that spurred the development of NABSW’s position in this area, see
generally Laura Briggs, Somebody’s Children, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 421 (2009).
25 In addition to the antimiscegenation laws that were invalidated by Loving, many states had
child-focused criminal or civil restrictions on interracial families during the Jim Crow era. See, e.g.,
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422 (1965) (prohibiting interracial adoptions); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS § 416 (LexisNexis 1957) (making it a criminal offense for a white
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informal or administrative in nature—were less likely to be codified, and, at
least in theory, less categorical, considering race as only “a factor” among
many.26 While formal and more categorical statutes and administrative
policies would later experience a resurgence, during the mid-1970s the
predominant uses of race in family law tended facially to be more flexible
and were typically justified as part of a global consideration of the child’s
best interests.27
Collectively, these changes in the political and legal context had a major
impact on judicial perceptions of the legitimacy of race restrictions in
family law. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, family law race restrictions
had been fairly uniformly identified by the courts as vestiges of the nation’s
Jim Crow past.28 But by the mid-1970s, this confluence of political and legal
changes had considerably complicated the characterization of race-based
family law decisionmaking as a form of invidious race discrimination. Like
affirmative action, the presence of minority advocates for race-based family
law policies—and the arguable deployment of such policies in service of a
“benign” goal (i.e., the best interest of the child) rendered the constitutional
assessment of racial family law policies far from unambiguous.29 Thus, as
the dominant discourse behind race-based family law restrictions shifted,
woman to conceive and bear an interracial child); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2585 (1962) (prohibiting
interracial children from being adopted by anyone); id. § 16-553 (making it a criminal offense to
place a white child in “the custody, control, maintenance or support of a negro”); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN., arts. 46a §(8), 46b-1 §(4) (1959) (prohibiting interracial adoptions). It appears that,
by the early 1970s, the most blatantly racist of these laws had been struck down or repealed or had
fallen into disuse, although many statutes requiring the consideration of race in adoption
remained. See, e.g., Compos, 341 F. Supp. at 264-68 (invalidating Louisiana’s law banning interracial
adoption); In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d at 657-59 (invalidating Texas law banning interracial adoption); see also Grossman, supra note 22, at 306-09 (noting that, as of 1968, Louisiana and Texas were
the only states that categorically prohibited interracial adoption, although many others required
consideration of race).
26 Of the race family law cases arising during the five-year period from 1973 through 1977,
none involved a statutory or regulatory policy requiring race-matching. Instead, most involved
informal judicial or administrative policies sanctioning race only as a factor in the best interest
analysis. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200,
1204-05 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); White v. Appleton, 304 So. 2d
206 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974); Niles v. Niles, 299 So.2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Raysor v.
Gabbey, 395 N.Y.S.2d 290 (App. Div. 1977). But cf. Beazley v. Davis, 545 P.2d 206, 207-08 (Nev.
1976) (finding that the lower court’s use of an apparently categorical approach to match children of
an interracial marriage with their minority parent was unconstitutional).
27 See Cynthia G. Hawkins-León & Carla Bradley, Race and Transracial Adoption: The Answer
Is Neither Simply Black or White nor Right or Wrong, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1227, 1241 (2002) (stating
that, as of 1987, “35 states prohibited the adoption of black children by white families”).
28 See supra note 20.
29 See supra note 26; see also In re B. Children, 89 Misc. 2d 493, 495-98 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977)
(treating reliance on race as valid based in part on its benign objectives).
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the judicial treatment of race restrictions in family law also changed direction, from near-universal rejection in the immediate post-Loving period to a
state of profound division.30
Mildred and Robert Drummond, a white couple from Douglasville,
Georgia, would be one of the families ultimately caught up in these changing
legal and political tides.31 In December 1973, the Drummonds became foster
parents when a one-month old, mixed-race infant named Timmy was placed
with them by the Fulton County Department of Family and Children’s
Services (DFCS).32 While the placement was originally made on an emergency basis, it soon became apparent that Timmy would not be imminently
reunited with his biological mother.33 In late 1974, the Drummonds expressed an interest in adopting Timmy, who had by then lived with them for
close to a year.34
There appears to have been no question that the Drummonds provided
excellent care for Timmy and loved him deeply. Indeed, the Drummonds’
care was described by DFCS personnel as “excellent,” “loving,” and “extremely
competent.”35 Another DFCS worker noted that the Drummonds were
“unusually attentive to the child’s medical and emotional needs and feel as if
they are the ‘natural’ family.”36 Nevertheless, DFCS decided that Timmy
would be better off with a black couple and that the Drummonds therefore
would not be permitted to adopt him.37 The Drummonds were informed
that they would be permitted to continue as Timmy’s foster parents, but
that Timmy ultimately would be removed and placed in a black adoptive
home.38
While the Drummonds originally acquiesced, within months of this initial
determination, the Drummonds sought reconsideration of their request to
30 Compare supra note 26 (listing cases that treated certain race-based family law practices as
valid based on their benign objectives), with Boone v. Boone, 565 P.2d 337, 339 (N.M. 1977)
(“[R]acial considerations alone cannot properly determine what is in the best interests of
children . . . .”); Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 299 A.2d 243 (Pa. 1973) (ruling that a
mother’s subsequent interracial marriage was not a compelling reason to deny her custody); and
Beazley v. Davis, 545 P.2d 206, 207-08 (Nev. 1976) (arguing that the use of race in adoption should
be subject to rigid scrutiny).
31 Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 547 F.2d 835, 837, 843
(5th Cir. 1977), vacated and rev’d by 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
910 (1978).
32 Id. at 837. Timmy’s mother was white and his father was black. Id.
33 Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1203.
34 Drummond, 547 F.2d at 837.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 841.
37 Id. at 837-41.
38 Id.
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adopt Timmy.39 And while the Drummonds’ social worker was initially
instructed to “stall with no encouragement,” the Drummonds were ultimately
permitted to apply for formal status as adoptive parents.40 The DFCS
caseworker who evaluated the Drummonds as adoptive parents expressed
limited concerns, but ultimately recommended that the Drummonds be
permitted to adopt, noting the Drummonds and Timmy’s love for each
other and the Drummonds’ appropriate dealings with issues concerning
Timmy’s race.41 Nevertheless, DFCS adhered to its original decision and
removed Timmy from the Drummonds’ home when he was two-and-a-half
years old.42
The Drummonds took legal action, first in federal and then in state
court, seeking to prevent (and then reverse) Timmy’s removal from their
home.43 Represented by pioneering civil rights lawyer Margie Pitts Hames44
(later joined by additional counsel, including Neil Bradley of the ACLU),
the Drummonds contended that the removal of Timmy from their home—
on the basis of their race and without any formal hearing—violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of equal protection and due process.45
The DFCS’s race-matching policy was, the Drummonds emphasized,
virtually categorical and replaced what had been until recently a formal
policy of segregation.46 Moreover, any alternative arguments raised by
DFCS for Timmy’s removal (which included the Drummonds’ age and
relatively racially homogeneous community) had never been articulated by
DFCS prior to the initiation of litigation.47

39
40
41
42
43

Id. at 841.
Id.
Id. at 843-46.
Id. at 846-48.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 437 U.S. 910 (1978) (No. 77-1381) [hereinafter Federal Drummond Petition]. The state
proceeding was initiated after the federal district court suggested in its decision that some of the
Drummonds’ claims might only be vindicated in state court. Id.; see also Drummond v. Fulton
Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 408 F. Supp. 382, 383-84 (N.D. Ga. 1976). These
parallel proceedings arguably should have been precluded, but no court ever reached the issue,
apparently because it was never raised by the defendants. Memorandum from William J. Brennan,
Jr., on Cases Held for No. 76-180, Smith v. Foster Families, to the Conference 4-5 (June 14, 1977)
(on file with the Library of Congress, Byron R. White Papers).
44 Margie Pitts Hames was a civil rights lawyer who litigated several important abortion
rights and desegregation cases. Her work is discussed in greater detail in TOMIKO BROWNNAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 409-29 (2011).
45 Drummond, 408 F. Supp. at 382; Federal Drummond Petition, supra note 43, at 7.
46 Federal Drummond Petition, supra note 43, at 11.
47 Drummond, 547 F.2d at 839, 849.
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The Drummonds’ claims were quickly rejected in the state courts, and
by late 1976, the Drummonds’ state appeal options had been exhausted.48
Thus, the Drummonds petitioned the Supreme Court for review of their
state case in January 1977,49 fortuitously just weeks before the case of Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families Equality and Reform50 (OFFER) was to be
argued. OFFER, which addressed the constitutional validity of New York’s
foster care procedures under the Due Process Clause, raised virtually
identical issues as those raised by the Drummonds’ due process claims (i.e.,
whether foster parents were entitled to procedural protections prior to the
removal of a foster child from their home).51 Because the Georgia Supreme
Court had focused almost exclusively on, and rejected, the Drummonds’ due
process claims, a plaintiff-favorable result in OFFER would arguably have
compelled a reversal in Drummond as well.52
Unfortunately for the Drummonds, while OFFER did not categorically
foreclose the possibility that a foster family might have a constitutional
interest warranting procedural protections, the opinion was hardly a
resounding endorsement of foster family rights. After expressing some
doubt as to whether the Court’s due process precedents could be extended
to the foster care context at all, the OFFER Court concluded that, in any
event, the procedures at issue in OFFER were constitutionally adequate.53
As such, the Drummonds’ state case—while held by the Court for OFFER54—
was denied certiorari days after OFFER was decided.55
48

Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 228 S.E.2d 839, 847 (Ga.

1976).
49 Docket Sheet, No. 76-984, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s
Servs. (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers).
50 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
51 Id. at 839.
52 Memorandum from D.B.A, Law Clerk, on No. 76-984-CSX, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty.
Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., to the Cert Pool 4 (Mar. 21, 1977) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers).
53 OFFER, 431 U.S. at 838-856.
54 Docket Sheet, No. 76-984, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s
Servs. (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers).
55 See OFFER, 431 U.S. at 816 (rendering a decision on June 13, 1977); Drummond v. Fulton
Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 432 U.S. 905 (1977) (denying certiorari on June 20,
1977). The Court did recognize that Drummond also encompassed an independent equal protection
claim but apparently believed that claim to be moot because of an erroneous belief that the
Drummonds had received—and the defendants had not challenged—the relief they sought as a
result of a favorable panel decision from the Fifth Circuit in the federal proceedings. See
Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr., on Cases Held for No. 76-180, Smith v. Foster
Families, to the Conference 4-5 (June 14, 1977) (on file with the Library of Congress, Byron R.
White Papers). In fact, the Defendants had sought, and had been granted, en banc review by the
time that certiorari was denied in the state case. Order Granting Rehearing En Banc, Drummond
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The Drummonds’ federal case, however, remained pending and would
present the race issue much more unambiguously for the Court’s review.
Ruling en banc in favor of DFCS shortly after the Supreme Court’s denial
of certiorari in the Drummonds’ state case, the Fifth Circuit squarely
rejected the Drummonds’ equal protection claims, emphatically affirming
the constitutional validity of the use of race in adoption.56 Noting that “[i]t
is a natural thing for children to be raised by parents of their same ethnic
background” and that the use of race in the Drummond’s case was “simply
another facet of finding [the child] the best possible home,” the Fifth
Circuit held that where, as here, there was “no racial slur or stigma,” there
was “no discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.”57
The Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion thus explicitly distinguished benign
uses of race, like adoption, from the Court’s race law precedents involving
invidious uses of race.58 Indeed, the primary authority on which the Fifth
Circuit relied was the Supreme Court’s splintered decision in United Jewish
Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. (UJO) v. Carey, the Court’s then-recent
attempt to grapple with the proper constitutional approach to “benign” uses
of race.59 While much of UJO’s reasoning related to the special constitutional
significance of the specific context in which it arose (a redistricting under
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act), a plurality opinion—heavily relied on
by the Drummond court—focused on the benign nature of the use of race at
issue, finding a broader lack of constitutional harm where “no racial slur or
stigma” was present.60 The Fifth Circuit’s decision thus squarely situated
itself within the burgeoning constitutional debates over the proper approach
to benign uses of race. And indeed, the Supreme Court was just beginning
v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 547 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1977). Ultimately, the
Drummonds’ panel victory would be entirely reversed by the Fifth Circuit en banc. Drummond v.
Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
56 Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1204-06.
57 Id. This perception of race-matching in adoption as “natural”—later also articulated by
other courts and internally by some of the Supreme Court’s justices—may well have arisen in part
from strong historical norms in the adoption context of placing children with families that would
be perceived as “natural” or biologically related to the child. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mini, Note,
Breaking Down the Barriers to Transracial Adoptions: Can the Multiethnic Placement Act Meet This
Challenge?, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 904 (1994) (observing that “adoptions were often ‘hidden’”
and that “[i]t was easier for the child to believe that his adoptive parents were actually his
biological parents if they all looked the same”); see also Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in BabyMaking: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 73 n.28 (2007) (“[U]ntil the
advent of open adoption in the 1990s, the very point of adoption was to simulate biological
parenthood all the way down . . . .”).
58 Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205.
59 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
60 Id. at 165-68; see also Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205 (relying on UJO for the proposition that
the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when there is “no racial slur or stigma”).
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to address in earnest such debates at the time that the Fifth Circuit, en
banc, decided Drummond. Several months earlier, in February 1977, the
Court had granted certiorari in the affirmative action case of Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.61 And while both of the Court’s prior
precedents addressing benign uses of race—UJO and the earlier case of
DeFunis v. Odegaard—were factually or procedurally unusual cases that did
not result in a broad circulation of the Justices’ substantive views,62 Bakke
presented a more straightforward opportunity for the Court to elaborate its
views.63 As such, Bakke was widely perceived—by both the public and the
Court itself—as a major opportunity for the Court to clarify its views on
the increasingly controversial and political question of how benign uses of
race should be treated as a matter of equal protection doctrine.64
True to this perception, Bakke in fact spurred, in the fall of 1977, the first
major exchange of views among the Justices on the constitutional standing
of affirmative action and other “benign” uses of race.65 “Unprecedented” in
61
62

429 U.S. 1090 (1977).
See UJO, 430 U.S. 144 (presenting a fractured set of opinions relying on the unique significance of the Voting Rights Act, and a complex array of other factors, to the outcome of the case);
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974) (per curiam) (finding that the case was moot and
therefore failing to reach the substantive arguments).
63 While not entirely uncomplicated, Bakke did involve fewer procedural and factual complications than the arguably fact-bound circumstances at issue in DeFunis and UJO. But see Bench
Memorandum on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke (Sept. 13, 1977) (on file with
the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (raising procedural and factual arguments for why Bakke was a nonideal vehicle for addressing the affirmative action issue).
64 See Paul Delaney, U.S. Brief to Support Minority Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1977, at
A1 (noting the sharp divide in society on how the case should be decided); Warren Weaver Jr.,
Justices Hear Bakke Arguments But Give Little Hint on Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1977, at A1
(recognizing Bakke as “probably the most significant civil rights case in 24 years”). Several
members of the Court also noted internally the need to elucidate the constitutionality of
affirmative action programs, and the opportunity that Bakke presented to do so. See, e.g., Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, to the
Conference (Oct. 14, 1977) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers);
Conference Notes of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke
(Oct. 14, 1977) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., Papers).
65 Hundreds of pages of memos were exchanged among the Justices in Bakke prior to the first
circulation of any draft opinion, which was an extremely unusual occurrence in the Court’s internal
practice. See Memorandum from Lewis S. Powell, Jr., on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, to the Conference 1 (Jan. 5, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J.
Brennan, Jr., Papers) (“The combination of the Chief ’s invitation to circulate memoranda and our
deferral of a definitive Conference vote have resulted in an unprecedented volume of circulations
in this case.”). In contrast, UJO and DeFunis occasioned limited written circulations, and very few
of those circulations addressed in substance the broader question of how “benign” racial classifications should be addressed. See generally File for No. 75-104, UJO v. Carey (on file with the Library
of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers); File for No. 73-235, DeFunis v. Odegaard (on file
with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers).
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the volume of conference memoranda that it generated, this exchange for
the first time made clear where the fault lines among the Justices lay.66 As
would become much more publicly visible in the Court’s later affirmative
action precedents, those fault lines sharply divided the Court, with many
Justices either strongly supporting or strongly opposing the application of
strict scrutiny to race-based affirmative action.67 Thus, while the ultimate
66
67

Memorandum from Lewis S. Powell, Jr., supra note 65.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Byron R. White on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, to the Conference 2-3 (Oct. 13, 1977) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J.
Brennan, Jr., Papers) (espousing no view on the standard of scrutiny, but concluding that the
university’s program was constitutional); Memorandum from Warren E. Burger on No. 76-811,
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, to the Conference 2-3 (Oct. 21, 1977) [hereinafter Burger
Bakke Memo] (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (expressing
the view that affirmative action must be subject to strict scrutiny and that the Davis program was
unconstitutional); Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, to the Conference 2, 7-9, 18 (Nov. 10, 1977) [hereinafter Rehnquist Bakke Memo]
(on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (same); Memorandum from
William J. Brennan, Jr., on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, to the Conference 5,
28-29 (Nov. 23, 1977) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers)
(expressing the view that affirmative action should not be subjected to strict scrutiny, but to a
lower “reasonable[ness]” standard and concluding that the university’s program was constitutional); Memorandum from Lewis S. Powell, Jr., on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
to the Conference 3 (Dec. 1, 1977) [hereinafter Powell Bakke Memo] (on file with the Library of
Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (arguing that strict scrutiny was required and that the
university’s program was unconstitutional, although some use of race might be permissible);
Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, to
the Conference 3 (Apr. 13, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Papers) (arguing against “color-blindness” as the principle by which to decide the case and arguing
for the constitutionality of affirmative action); Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun on No. 76811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, to the Conference 11-13 (May 1, 1978) (on file with the
Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (implying that strict scrutiny review was not
appropriate for “benign” uses of race and expressing the view that the university’s program was
constitutional, though perhaps just barely); see also Conference Notes of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., on
No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke (Dec. 9, 1977) [hereinafter Dec. 9, 1977 Conference Notes] (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Papers) (making clear that although Justice Stewart did not circulate his views in a memorandum,
he believed that the Equal Protection Clause categorically precluded adverse government actions
based on race). Interestingly, the internal papers suggest that there were potentially five votes on
the Court in favor of applying strict scrutiny in Bakke, although the Justices diverged substantially
on what the implications of strict scrutiny should be for the Davis policy. Justices Powell, Burger,
Stewart, and Rehnquist unwaveringly expressed the opinion that strict scrutiny must be applied to
“benign” uses of race. Powell Bakke Memo, supra, at 3-5; Burger Bakke Memo, supra, at 2-3;
Rehnquist Bakke Memo, supra, at 7-12; Dec. 9, 1977 Conference Notes, supra. And though Justice
White ultimately joined Justice Brennan’s opinion applying only intermediate scrutiny, he initially
felt strongly for “political” reasons that strict scrutiny should be applied (and confusingly joined
portions of Powell’s opinion arguing for strict scrutiny, while also joining Brennan’s opinion).
Memorandum from C.D.L., Law Clerk, to William J. Brennan, Jr. (on file with the Library of
Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers); see Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Piercing the Veil: William
J. Brennan’s Account of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 19 YALE L. & POL’ Y REV.
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Bakke opinions showed little division on the constitutional standard—with
four of the five Justices to reach the constitutional issue voting for a relaxed,
intermediate level of scrutiny—internally, it was clear that deep divisions
were emerging on the constitutional propriety of benign uses of race.
Given this backdrop, the en banc Drummond decision—which came to
the Court on March 29, 1978, just weeks before Bakke was decided—had
obvious considerations favoring a grant of certiorari.68 Most notably, the
Drummond court’s standard—one of no constitutional scrutiny for “benign”
uses of race—was one that not even the Court’s race liberals were prepared
to endorse.69 It thus provided an opportunity for the Court to speak on a
unified basis regarding at least some facet of the complex and unsettled
treatment of benign uses of race. Moreover, the Drummond Court’s reliance
on the UJO plurality,70 a decision that would be contradicted by both of the
constitutionally based opinions issued in Bakke,71 made the case an obvious
candidate for a Grant, Vacate, and Remand (GVR) (i.e., a direction to the
lower court to reexamine the issue in view of later, more authoritative
precedent).72

341, 358, 362-63, 368 (2001) (reproducing Justice Brennan’s narrative regarding the Court’s internal
consideration of Bakke and noting Justice White’s desire for strict scrutiny); see also Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-91 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (rejecting, in a part of
the opinion joined by Justice White, the notion that something less than strict scrutiny should
apply); id., 438 U.S. at 356-59 (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding, in an opinion joined by Justice
White, that only intermediate scrutiny was required).
68 Federal Drummond Petition, supra note 43; see also Memorandum from Warren E. Burger
on No. 77-1381, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., to the Conference (June 5, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers) (noting that
Drummond was to be discussed at the Court’s June 8, 1978, conference); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(indicating that the case was decided June 28, 1978).
69 See Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205
(5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (concluding categorically that the “use of race as one of the factors [in
placing a child for adoption] is legitimate,” based in part on the Court’s reading of UJO as
mandating that where “there is ‘no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race’
there is no discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment” (quoting UJO v. Carey, 430
U.S. 144, 165 (1977))); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 356-59 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“On the other
hand, the fact that this case does not fit neatly into our prior analytic framework for race cases
does not mean that it should be analyzed by applying the very loose rational-basis standard of
review that is the very least that is always applied in equal protection cases.”).
70 UJO, 430 U.S. at 165.
71 See supra note 67 (setting out the Justices’ views regarding the appropriate standard of
review in Bakke).
72 Sara C. Benesh, GVRs and Their Aftermath in the Seventh Circuit and Beyond, 32 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 659, 662-64 (2008).
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Despite these arguable strengths, the Court denied certiorari in Drummond less than ten days before Bakke was decided.73 And while available
records do not conclusively establish the reasons for the denial, the cert pool
memo—drafted by one of Justice Blackmun’s law clerks and circulated to
Justices Blackmun, Burger, White, Powell, and Rehnquist—suggests that, at
least to some, adoption was simply different as a matter of common sense.74
Thus, Justice Blackmun’s clerk asserted boldly without citation, “As to petrs’
equal protection claims, acceptance of petrs’ argument that race should not
be considered in making adoption decisions, would defy the nearunanimous practice of state adoption agencies and the consensus among
psychologists and sociologists.”75 Although recognizing the potential
doctrinal overlaps with Bakke (overlaps that had been specifically highlighted
by the Drummonds in their petition for certiorari), the author of the memo
dismissed Drummond without explanation as “aris[ing] in such different
factual context [sic] that I believe a hold is unwarranted.”76
Not all of the Justices agreed with this assessment. Justices White and
Brennan voted to grant certiorari in Drummond, and even took the unusual
step of noting their disagreement in the published order denying certiorari
review.77 And two other Justices, Marshall and Stevens, struggled with their
votes in Drummond, initially voting to grant certiorari but later changing

73 Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 437 U.S. 910 (1978);
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
74 Memorandum from K.E., Law Clerk, on No. 77-1381, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of
Family & Children’s Servs., to Cert Pool 13 (June 1, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress,
Harry A. Blackmun Papers). As to the Drummonds’ due process claim, the memorandum
recommended a denial because, inter alia, the case was unusual insofar as the agency was initially
unaware that Timmy was biracial and thus “[t]he presumably unusual fact that resps were
originally unaware of the child’s race puts resps’ subsequent decision to remove Timmy from the
Drummonds’ care in a very different perspective from the normal decision to re-place a child.” Id.
at 12-13.
75 Id. at 13. Justice Blackmun’s marked up version of the memo did not comment directly on
the passage discussing the Drummonds’ equal protection claims, but he did place a check mark
next to it, id. at 13, suggesting agreement with the point being made.
76 Id. at 13; see also Federal Drummond Petition, supra note 43, at 25-26; cf. Memorandum from
E.S., Law Clerk to Thurgood Marshall, on the legislative history of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (circulated to the Conference by Justice Marshall on Oct. 28, 1977) (on file with
Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (discussing the legislative history of Title VI
as it relates to affirmative action programs and noting that an amendment to Title VI that would
have “expressly authorized federal grantees to take race into account in placing children in
adoptive and foster homes” was rejected as unnecessary, thus supporting the inference that
Congress did not expect to eliminate all potentially benign uses of race by enacting Title VI).
77 See Drummond, 437 U.S. 910; see also Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Analyzing the Reliability of Supreme Court Justices’ Agenda-Setting Records, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 254, 256 (2009) (noting that
votes of Justices as to certiorari are rarely published).
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their votes to deny.78 But for the Court’s race conservatives—those who had
argued most stridently that race restrictions of any kind must be subject to
the most rigorous constitutional scrutiny during the debates on Bakke—
Drummond apparently did not present an appealing candidate for review.79
As a result, on June 15, 1978, the Drummonds’ long legal crusade came
quietly to an end with the denial of their petition for certiorari.80
II. DRUMMOND TO PALMORE: 1978–1984
The lower courts’ treatment of race in the family law context, already
divided at the time that Drummond was decided, would become even more
so in the period following the Court’s denial of certiorari in Drummond.
Indeed, during the six-year period between Drummond and the Supreme
Court’s next major race family law case (Palmore v. Sidoti), the lower courts
would issue opinions that were almost equally divided in affirming and
rejecting government uses of racial criteria in the family.81 This division,
moreover, was not simply reflective of differing bottom line results, but
instead extended to virtually every feature of race family law litigation.
Thus, deep divisions emerged in the post-Drummond era about whether the
use of race in family law (by public agencies or courts) was ever permissible;

78 See Docket Sheet, No. 77-1381, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s
Servs. (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) (showing a change in
Justice Marshall’s vote from “grant” to “deny” and noting that ultimately only “B-W wd G”—i.e.,
only Brennan, and White voted to grant cert despite the fact that Stevens is shown to have voted
for “grant”).
79 Id. (showing that none of the Justices who endorsed strict scrutiny in the internal debates
over Bakke, including Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and Powell, voted in
favor of review in Drummond).
80 Drummond, 437 U.S. 910.
81 A significant number of cases during this time affirmed lower court or agency decisions
that relied in part on race. See, e.g., Russell v. Russell, 399 N.E.2d 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(affirming a change in custody that considered the mother’s interracial marriage); In re Marriage of
Kramer, 297 N.W.2d 359 (Iowa 1980) (holding that while race can be a factor, it was improperly
used in the trial court’s decision, but nevertheless affirming the trial court’s decision on other
grounds); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1983) (allowing the consideration of race in adoption and
foster care matters). On the other hand, several decisions during this time also reversed lower
court or agency uses of race or rejected litigant requests to make race a dispositive factor. See, e.g.,
In re Mikelson, 299 N.W.2d 670, 673-74 (Iowa 1980) (considering the parents’ connection to a
racial community in custody disputes over adoptive biracial children, but ultimately deeming it
nondispositive); Edel v. Edel, 293 N.W.2d 792 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (rejecting a change in
custody based on an interracial relationship); In re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d 111 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982) (noting that a change in custody based on an interracial relationship was inappropriate).
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if so, to what extent; and what, if anything, was the role of constitutional
adjudication (as opposed to state family law) in resolving these disputes.82
These divisions, moreover, were not restricted simply to the adoption
issue presented to the Court in Drummond (or to its closely related cousin,
interracial foster care placements). Two other race-based family law practices
continued to trouble the courts during the pre-Palmore time period, and
both occasioned similarly divisive responses. Thus, the use of race as a “plus
factor” for minority parents in custody disputes between interracial parents,
as well as the use of a parent’s post-divorce interracial marriage as a basis for
denying custody, resulted in similarly divided responses from the courts.83
And, as in the adoption context, these divisions extended far beyond surface
outcomes to fundamental disagreements about the legal principles under
which race family law claims should be adjudicated.
It was during this unsettled time that Linda Palmore and her exhusband, Anthony Sidoti, would find themselves litigating over whether the
race of Linda’s new husband should result in the loss of her custody of their
young daughter.84 Upon the couple’s divorce in 1980, Linda had been
awarded custody of their then two-year-old daughter, Melanie.85 But just
over a year later, Linda and Anthony were back in court, with Anthony

82 See, e.g., In re Petition of R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 784-94 (D.C. 1982) (concluding that strict
scrutiny was required under the Equal Protection Clause and reversing and remanding the lower
court determination because its use of race did not meet the strictures of strict scrutiny); Palmore
v. Sidoti, 426 So.2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (relying on the race of the mother’s spouse as a
basis for a change in custody); Russell, 399 N.E.2d at 213-15 (concluding that the lower court
complied with state law in relying on the mother’s interracial marriage as one factor among many);
In re Mikelson, 299 N.W.2d at 673-74 (stating that race can be a consideration under state custody
law, albeit not a controlling one); In re Kramer, 297 N.W.2d at 360-63 (affirming the lower court
decision relying on race, but also stating in dicta that the lower court’s use of race was impermissible as a matter of state law); Edel, 293 N.W.2d at 794-95 (concluding that the race of the mother’s
fiancé was an improper consideration—apparently as a matter of state law—and remanding for a
reassessment without consideration of that factor); Farmer v. Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d 137, 140-47
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (noting that race can be a consideration under state custody law, but finding
that here it was not controlling); In re Haven, No. C-780343, 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 9744, at *1-15
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1979) (finding that the use of race in adoption was constitutionally
permissible even where based on a policy of “favoring the adoption of white children by whites
and black children by blacks”); In re Davis, 465 A.2d at 623-29 (concluding that the lower court
erred in not considering race in a foster care/adoption dispute and finding that consideration of a
race as a factor is constitutional); Temos, 450 A.2d at 119-22 (finding that an interracial relationship
could not be a basis for a custody modification, but not specifying whether the ruling was based on
constitutional principles, state law, or both).
83 See supra note 82.
84 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 3-4, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (No. 821734) [hereinafter Palmore Petition].
85 Id. at 3.
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seeking to obtain custody.86 Contending that Linda (who was white) “ha[d]
not acted in the best interest and welfare of [Melanie] in that she ha[d] had
a black male living with her for some period of time,” and that she had also
been neglectful in allowing Melanie to contract lice and wear clothes stained
with mildew, Anthony requested that he be awarded custody of Melanie,
who was then four.87
The trial court—while rejecting Anthony’s suggestions that Linda had
been neglectful of Melanie’s health or clothing—found that Linda’s actions
in dating a black man outside of wedlock were “of some significance.”88 The
court observed, “despite the strides that have been made in bettering
relations between the races in this country, it is inevitable that Melanie will,
if allowed to remain in her present situation . . . suffer from the social
stigmatization that is sure to come.”89 It thus concluded that Melanie’s best
interests would be served by living in her father’s (monoracial) household,
and granted his request for a custody modification.90
This order by the trial court—issued six months after Anthony Palmore’s
initial petition for modification—was summarily affirmed by the Florida
District Court of Appeals in December 1982.91 As a result, under Florida
law, the Florida Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear any further
appeal.92 Thus, by early 1983, Linda Palmore’s state court appeal options
had been exhausted.93 Her attorneys, after unsuccessfully seeking a stay
from the Florida District Court of Appeals, petitioned the United States
Supreme Court directly for a stay of Melanie’s removal from Linda’s
custody.94
Because the case arose in the geographical jurisdiction of the Eleventh
Circuit, the Palmore v. Sidoti stay application was initially directed to Justice
Powell,95 the Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit.96 Arguably, this was a

86
87
88
89
90
91

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 27.
Palmore v. Sidoti, 426 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), rev’d, 466 U.S. 429 (1984);
Palmore Petition, supra note 84, at *5-6.
92 Memorandum from Caldwell, Law Clerk, on No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to the Conference 3 n.2 (Feb. 16, 1983) (on file with the Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers).
93 Id. at 3.
94 Palmore Petition, supra note 84, at 1, 9-10, 30.
95 Memorandum from Caldwell, supra note 92 (making clear that Justice Powell adjudicated
the original Palmore stay).
96 See Lois J. Scali, Prediction-Making in the Supreme Court: The Granting of Stays by Individual
Justices, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1020, 1025 n.33 (1985) (setting out the identity of the individual Justices
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good draw for the Palmore side of the case. In Bakke, Powell had affirmed a
strong commitment to strictly scrutinizing all uses of race, including even
those adopted with putatively benign motives.97 In addition, in Fullilove v.
Klutznik, decided two years after Bakke, Powell had reiterated his commitment to the strict scrutiny standard of review, despite finding the specific
use of race at issue to be constitutionally valid.98 Thus, the state court’s
decision in Palmore—uncritically relying on racial considerations without
any form of constitutional scrutiny—seemed to facially conflict with
Powell’s publicly expressed views on race law doctrine.99
Powell, however, apparently regarded the Palmore case as a wholly undesirable matter for the Court to take up. While the reasons are not clear from
the internal documents, his notes on the stay have repeated annotations
suggesting his antipathy for the case: “This is the white/black marriagechild custody case. We should not get into this.”100 And again, on a later
date: “Deny[.] This is [the] case where petr—a white woman remarried a
black. She & first husband are fighting over child custody . . . .”101
Under Supreme Court rules, however, Powell was not the final word on
whether Linda Palmore’s stay request would be granted. Then, as now, a
stay applicant may reapply to any other Justice following the denial of a
stay.102 Thus, following Powell’s initial denial of the stay, Linda Palmore
reapplied to Justice Marshall, who, in accordance with Court convention,
referred the matter to the full Court.103 There, her stay request piqued
assigned to hear stays from particular circuits at roughly the time that the Palmore stay would have
been considered).
97 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-305 (1978) (Powell, J.) (stating
that all racial and ethnic distinctions must be subjected to strict scrutiny).
98 448 U.S. 448, 496-99, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that adherence to a strict
scrutiny standard is “important and consistent with precedent”).
99 Palmore Petition, supra note 84, at 26-27. Of course, as the work of Anders Walker has
unearthed, Powell’s views on race and the law were complex and derived from a view that racial
separatism and segregation could potentially foster genuine pluralism. Anders Walker, Diversity’s
Strange Career: Recovering the Racial Pluralism of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
647, 648, 672-77 (2010). Viewed through this lens, it is perhaps less surprising that Powell did not
view racial integration within the family as a particularly desirable matter for the Court to take up.
100 Handwritten Notation on Memorandum from Alexander L. Stevas, Clerk of Court, on
No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to the Conference (Feb. 18, 1983) (on file with the Washington and
Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers).
101 Memorandum from Caldwell, supra note 92; Handwritten Notation on Docket Sheet, A664, Palmore v. Sidoti (Mar. 3, 1983) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of
Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers).
102 SUP. C T. R. 22.
103 Memorandum from Caldwell, supra note 92; see also Scali, supra note 96, at 1021 (explaining that such reapplications are almost universally referred to the full court and subsequently
denied).
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greater interest, with six of the Justices—including all of the Court’s race
liberals—“calling for a response” (i.e., requesting that the Respondent
submit a statement in response to the stay application).104
The resulting response was, in the words of Powell’s law clerk, “miserable.”105 While contending that other, nonracial factors also influenced the
trial court’s decision, Sidoti conceded that race was a salient factor.106
Additionally, Sidoti’s primary constitutional argument—that Florida
authority held only “that the effect of an interracial marriage upon a
particular child is one of the many factors that may be considered in determining
the best interest of the child”107—was arguably in significant tension with
other constitutional decisions of the Court, which had recognized that even
partial influence, where dispositive, violates the Constitution.108
On the other hand, the response also had, according to Powell’s clerk,
“[o]ne key point.”109 “The mandate [was] issued in February” and thus by
the time the full Court considered the issue, Melanie was already in Sidoti’s
custody.110 As Powell’s clerk observed, “therefore by this Court’s own delay,
the application appears moot—the irreparable injury has occurred already.”111
He thus concluded that “TM [Thurgood Marshall] blew it,” an apparent
reference to Justice Marshall’s desire (contrary to Powell’s own) to have the
Court grant a stay.112
104 See Docket Sheet, A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti (Feb. 18, 1984) (on file with Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (identifying Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens and O’Connor as calling for a response, and Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and
Rehnquist as voting against).
105 Handwritten Notation of M.N. on Docket Sheet, No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti (Mar. 2,
1983) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Papers).
106 See Memorandum of A.S.M., Law Clerk, to Harry A. Blackmun, on No. A-664, Palmore
v. Sidoti (Mar. 3, 1983) (on file with Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers).
107 Id. (emphasis added).
108 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (holding that partial
influence of an unconstitutional consideration, where dispositive, violates the Constitution);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (explaining
that where race was a motivating factor, a defendant could avoid constitutional liability only by
showing that “the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been
considered”). But see Banks, Color of Desire, supra note 5, at 904-05 (describing a number of
contexts in which the courts have treated classifications involving “race as a factor” as if they did
not entail a racial classification).
109 Handwritten Notation of M.N. on Docket Sheet, supra note 105.
110 Id.
111 Id.; see also Memorandum from A.S.M., Law Clerk, on No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to
Harry A. Blackmun (Mar. 3, 1983) (on file with Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers)
(expressing a similar sentiment regarding the case’s mootness).
112 Handwritten Notation of M.N. on Docket Sheet, supra note 105; see also Memorandum
from Thurgood Marshall on No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to the Conference (Feb. 18, 1983) (on
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Indeed, when the Court voted on the merits of the stay two days later, it
overwhelmingly voted to deny.113 Only Justice Stevens, in a move he would
later note as a particular point of pride, voted to grant the stay.114 And while
the Court would ultimately grant certiorari and rule unanimously in Linda
Palmore’s favor—elevating her case to canonical status—for Palmore herself,
the stay decision would prove to be the one that mattered. During the two
years following Melanie’s removal, Palmore would see her daughter only
once, on a court-ordered visit three months after the Supreme Court ruled
in her favor.115 By 1986, more than two years after her putative victory in the
Supreme Court, Palmore was reportedly preparing to sign papers awarding
custody of Melanie to her husband in exchange for visitation rights,116 still
not having reestablished even regular contact with her daughter.117
At the time, however, Linda Palmore could not have known that a Supreme Court decision in her favor would ultimately have little effect. Thus,
in April 1983, shortly after the denial of the stay by the full Court, she
petitioned for a writ of certiorari.118 Contending that the trial court rested
its decision solely on the race of her husband, Palmore argued that, under
Loving v. Virginia, “[t]he equal protection and due process clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . prohibit a court . . . from relying upon a
subsequent interracial marriage . . . as a ground for ordering a change in
custody.”119 She further observed that her case was different from others
where the Court had approved the use of race, noting that “[n]o modern
decision of this Court has sustained a racial classification which burdens or
stigmatizes black citizens on the basis of race.”120
Despite the relatively extended discussion that the Palmore stay application had prompted, the cert pool memorandum addressing the Palmore
petition—drafted by one of Justice Powell’s law clerks and circulated to
Justices Powell, O’Connor, Rehnquist, Blackmun, Burger, and White—
file with the Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers) (indicating that Marshall would
grant the stay).
113 Docket Sheet, No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers); Palmore v. Sidoti, 460 U.S. 1018 (1983)
(denying stay).
114 Docket Sheet, No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 113; see also John Paul Stevens,
Learning on the Job, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1561, 1564 (2006).
115 Andrew M. Williams, Domestic News, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 21, 1984, available at
LexisNexis Academic.
116 TV Drama ‘Fictionalized’ Custody Fight, Lawyer Says, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 8,
1986, at 34A.
117 Id.
118 Palmore Petition, supra note 84.
119 Id. at 17.
120 Id. at 16.
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devoted a mere two-and-a-half double-spaced pages to Palmore’s request for
certiorari review.121 Noting that “[i]t appears . . . that the principal reason
for denying the stay was that the case did not appear cert-worthy to four
Justices,” Powell’s clerk observed that “[n]othing has happened in the last
three months to make this case any more cert-worthy now than it was
then.”122 Without discussing the merits or independent cert-worthiness of
Palmore’s claims further, Powell’s clerk recommended that the Court deny
review.123
This framing of the issue, and of the stay proceedings as having been
predicated on Palmore’s merits, was arguably at least partially misleading.
After all, just months earlier, Powell’s chambers had contended that the
principal reason for denying the stay was its mootness, an issue material only
to the stay proceedings’ requirement of “irreparable injury.”124 Nevertheless,
the pool memorandum drafted by Powell’s law clerk failed to even mention the
different standards that applied to a stay or the possibility that those standards
cut against affording too much weight to the initial stay proceedings.125
On the other hand, it appears that Powell’s clerk was in fact correct that
there was not widespread support on the Court for a grant of certiorari in
Palmore. At first, only two Justices, Brennan and Stevens, voted unequivocally to grant certiorari review.126 Two other Justices, Marshall and
Blackmun, cast “Join-3” votes, signifying that their vote should count as a
grant vote only if there were three others in favor.127 Thus, Palmore squeaked
by on the narrowest of margins, granted review only as a result of a change in
Justice Marshall’s vote from a “Join 3” to a “Grant” after the initial polling.128
The Court’s reluctance to grant review—despite Palmore’s presentation of
an issue that many today would characterize as having obvious constitutional
121 Memorandum from M.S., Law Clerk, on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to the Cert Pool
(June 9, 1983) (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) [hereinafter
Palmore Cert Pool Memo].
122 Id. at 3.
123 Id.
124 Handwritten Notation of M.N. on Docket Sheet, supra note 105; see also Memorandum
from Caldwell, supra note 92 (setting out the four requirements needed for a stay to be granted,
including irreparable injury).
125 Palmore Cert Pool Memo, supra note 121, at 3.
126 Docket Sheet, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry
A. Blackmun Papers); Docket Sheet, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Washington
and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers).
127 See supra note 126; see also Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme
Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1239 (2012) (explaining that a “Join-3” is
counted as a “Grant” vote only if at least three other Justices vote in favor of granting review).
128 Four Justices must vote in favor in order for a case to be granted certiorari. Owens &
Simon, supra note 127, at 1227.
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significance—may have reflected factors unrelated to the Justices’ views of
the fundamental legal question it presented. The appellate court did not
write a decision in Palmore, and thus there was only the trial court’s terse
order for the Court’s review.129 Moreover, it was not entirely clear whether
the interracial marriage issue had been the sole consideration in the change
of custody, although all of the Justices seem to have agreed that it was the
predominant factor.130 In addition, the lower courts—both the trial court in
Palmore itself and others that had addressed the same issue—had typically
ignored constitutional arguments raised by the parties, instead relying on
state custody law.131 Thus, while Palmore was typical of the period’s race
family law cases in both substance and format, it was arguably a nonideal
vehicle for certiorari review by traditional Supreme Court standards.132
But there were also substantive reasons—later articulated during the
course of the Palmore proceedings—why many of the Justices may have seen
Palmore as a troubling case to take up. Among other things, while the
Justices widely viewed the removal of a child from a natural parent based on
that parent’s interracial marriage (the issue in Palmore) to be constitutionally
impermissible, they did not share the same view of other remaining uses of
race in family law, particularly adoption.133 As such, several of the Justices
129 Palmore Petition, supra note 84, at 21-24; see also Memorandum from Caldwell, supra note
92 (noting that this factor made the case somewhat less appealing for review, although review was
probably warranted); Memorandum from M.E.N., Law Clerk, on No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to
Lewis S. Powell (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., Papers) (noting the absence of an appellate opinion as a reason to deny review in the case);
Typewritten Notation, Palmore Cert Pool Memo, supra note 121, at 1 (noting this issue but
recommending a “Grant”).
130 Palmore Petition, supra note 84, at 21-24; see also Memorandum from M.E.N., supra note
129 (noting this concern, but also noting that the interracial marriage “was decisive to the courts
below”); Handwritten Notation on Memorandum from M.S., Law Clerk, on No. 82-1734, Palmore
v. Sidoti, to the Cert Pool (Sept. 19, 1983) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School
of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers) (noting this concern, but also noting that racial factors appear
to have predominated); Memorandum from Caldwell, supra note 92 (same); cf. Memorandum
from Warren E. Burger to William J. Brennan (Mar. 21, 1984) (on file with the Library of
Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (resisting Brennan’s efforts to argue that the draft
opinion should be modified to broadly prohibit the use of race as a factor on the grounds that
“[r]ace was the dispositive basis and that surely is clear”).
131 Palmore Petition, supra note 84, at 21-24; see also supra note 82.
132 See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text; see also Memorandum from A.S.M., Law
Clerk, on No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to Harry A. Blackmun 2 (Mar. 3, 1983) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) (suggesting that “it might be better to await a
clear constitutional conflict before granting a case involving the problem [of interracial marriage
and child custody cases]”).
133 See Docket Sheet, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Library of Congress,
William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (documenting the unanimous vote in Palmore on the merits); see
also Memorandum from Lewis S. Powell on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti 2 (Jan. 31, 1984) (on file
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(largely the Court’s race conservatives),134 expressed deep concerns that a
ruling in favor of Linda Palmore might be read to prohibit the restriction of
transracial adoptions.135 Indeed, this issue—whether a ruling precluding the
with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers) (showing
that although Powell opposed granting review, he agreed that the lower court’s use of race was
“invalid” once the petition for certiorari was granted); cf. Post-Argument Memorandum from
K.R.B., Law Clerk, on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti 2 (Feb. 22, 1984) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Byron R. White Papers) (arguing that while the lower court decision might be flawed
because of the lack of evidence of harm, a categorical rule was unjustified because “I do not
understand why the Constitution should consign [a child] to an inferior home on the ground that
factually relevant, but legally irrelevant, criteria cannot be considered”).
134 For a discussion of which Justices articulated concerns regarding the adoption issue and
their broader positions at the time regarding the necessity of subjecting putatively benign uses of
race to strict scrutiny, see infra notes 135-42. See generally supra note 12 for a definitional
discussion of how specific Justices were classified as “race conservatives,” “race liberals,” or “race
moderates,” for the purposes of this Article.
135 See, e.g., Blackmun Conference Notes on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti [hereinafter
Blackmun Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti] (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A.
Blackmun Papers) (noting the following Justices’ remarks—Chief Justice: “W[oul]d n[ot] touch
adoption”; Rehnquist: “Eschew adoption”; Stevens: “[A]doption agencies do try to accom[modate]”); Brennan Conference Notes on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti [hereinafter
Brennan Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti] (on file with the Library of Congress, William J.
Brennan, Jr., Papers) (including the following remarks—Chief Justice: “This is custody, not
adoption, which I wouldn’t touch”; Powell: “Agree with CJ”; Rehnquist: “Agree with CJ”); Oral
Argument Notes of Justice Powell on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti [hereinafter Palmore Oral
Argument Notes] (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Papers) (“Adoption is different.”); Powell Conference Notes on No. 72-1734, Palmore v.
Sidoti [hereinafter Powell Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti] (on file with the Washington and
Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers) (noting the following—Chief Justice:
“No[t] like an adoption case—this would be different”; White: “Agree with CJ”; Rehnquist:
“Avoid discussion of adoption—not here”; Stevens: “If this were an adoption case, it would be
different. Biological considerations are important”); see also Post-Argument Memorandum from
K.R.B., supra note 133, at 3 (expressing concerns that a broadly written opinion in Palmore would
interfere with the common practice of adoption agencies to place children with parents of the
same race as the child, and might also interfere with similar practices in the custody context);
Memorandum from E.T. on No. 72-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to Harry A. Blackmun 8 (Feb. 17,
1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) (expressing the view that
“adoption is different”). This attention to adoption is perhaps unsurprising given that the
Respondent in Palmore repeatedly attempted to draw parallels to the adoption context in arguing
in support of the use of race at issue in Palmore. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent in Opposition to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-7, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (No. 82-1734) (relying
on Drummond to argue that the Court had specifically rejected “[a]ny claim that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a state from considering racial attitudes in determining the child’s
welfare”); Brief for Respondent at *6-13 & n.8 & n.23, & *14 n.33, Palmore, 466 U.S. 429 (No. 821734) (seeking to equate the type of classification at issue in Palmore with the adoption context, and
to distinguish both from the type of classification at issue in Loving); Oral Argument Transcript,
Palmore v. Sidoti, No. 82-1734 [hereinafter Palmore Oral Argument Transcript], available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_1734/#transcript-text554 (drawing parallels to
adoption, in argument for the state, at oral argument). The Solicitor General’s brief in Palmore also
noted possible parallels to adoption but argued that there were potential distinguishing factors that
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use of race in Palmore would compel a similar result in the adoption context—was of such central concern to the Justices that it was among the first
questions posed to Linda Palmore’s counsel at oral argument.136 (Counsel
assured the Justices that adoption—which involved “a person who was not a
biological parent”—was “much different than [what] we have here.”137)
At the conference for Palmore, the adoption concern again surfaced, with
several of the Court’s race conservatives (and Justice Stevens) arguing that
the Palmore decision should not be drafted in such a way as to extend to
adoption.138 Adoption, those Justices noted, was “different.”139 “Biological
considerations,” they argued, mattered in the adoption context and might
mandate a different result.140 They thus profoundly differentiated between
the specific custody issue before the Court and adoption, which several
Justices opined they “wouldn’t touch.”141 Ultimately, three Justices (Burger,
Rehnquist and Stevens) all specifically noted in conference that the decision
in Palmore should be drafted to avoid the adoption issue, a sentiment with
which Justices White and Powell (and possibly also Justice O’Connor)
apparently agreed.142
could allow the Court to strike down the use of interracial marriage in custody while leaving
adoption open to future consideration. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, at 21 n.8, Palmore, 466 U.S. 429 (No. 82-1734) [hereinafter United States Palmore Brief];
see also Memorandum from E.T., supra note 135 (discussing the Solicitor General’s position on this
issue).
136 Palmore Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 135.
137 Id.
138 Blackmun Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135; Brennan Conference Notes,
Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135; Powell Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135.
139 Supra note 138. By contrast, Justice Blackmun expressed disagreement with this point and
believed that an “[a]doption case may not be different.” Powell Conference Notes, Palmore v.
Sidoti, supra note 135.
140 Powell Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135; see also supra note 138.
141 Brennan Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135; see also supra note 138.
142 See supra note 135; see also Palmore Oral Argument Notes, supra note 135, at 2 (identifying
Justice O’Connor as the source of questioning about adoption concerns at oral argument). All of
these Justices can be characterized as race conservatives or race moderates at the time Palmore was
decided. Since Bakke, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Powell had internally
expressed the view that all uses of race had to be subjected to strict scrutiny; however, they varied
in the time frame during which they first publicly expressed that view, as well as in the extent to
which they believed that specific affirmative action programs should accordingly be invalidated.
See supra note 67 (documenting the internal circulations in Bakke); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (Powell, joined by Burger and Rehnquist, expressing the
view that strict scrutiny was required and that the use of race at issue was invalid); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496-99, 523-35 (1980) (Stewart, joined by Rehnquist and Powell,
expressing the view that strict scrutiny was required, but dividing on whether the specific program
was constitutional); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (showing that
only Powell reached the constitutional issue and would have required strict scrutiny). Justice
Stevens had historically opposed affirmative action, but was, at the time, beginning to drift to the
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If the Court’s race conservatives were concerned about Palmore’s potential implications for adoption, several of its race liberals were concerned
about its possible meaning for the ongoing battles over affirmative action.143
Despite the apparent victory that the Court’s race liberals had achieved in
Fullilove v. Klutznick (the Court’s then–most recent foray into the affirmative action arena), the 1983 Term marked a tenuous time for affirmative
action on the Court.144 Ronald Reagan, elected in 1980, had staked out an
anti-affirmative action position in his campaign.145 And, the October 1983
Term—with the Title VII case of Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts—
marked the first major opportunity for the Reagan Administration to
articulate its views to the Court.146
The Stotts brief, signed by Solicitor General Rex Lee, was true to
Reagan’s anti-affirmative action platform.147 The district court in Stotts had
modified a Title VII consent decree (which, as originally written, would
have required layoffs to occur in straight seniority order) to avoid reversing

left and would ultimately join the race liberals on the Court. Diane Marie Amann, John Paul
Stevens and Equally Impartial Government, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 885, 887-90 (2010). And Justice
White, who had initially embraced intermediate scrutiny in Bakke, was drifting to the right and
would soon provide the dispositive vote on the Court for applying strict scrutiny to state and local
government affirmative action. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-95
(1989) (showing that Justice White joined the plurality opinion applying strict scrutiny); id. at 520
(Scalia, J., concurring) (providing the fifth vote in Croson for strict scrutiny); Bakke, 438 U.S. at
356 (Brennan, J., concurring) (showing that Justice White joined Justice Brennan’s concurrence
requiring only intermediate scrutiny). Interestingly, this transition may have marked relatively
little change on the personal level, as Justice White apparently felt in Bakke that strict scrutiny was
the appropriate standard and acceded to intermediate scrutiny only at Justice Brennan’s urging. See
supra note 67.
143 See infra notes 161-65. It is not entirely clear how broadly this concern was shared among
the Court’s race liberals (and Justice Stevens, then drifting toward the race liberal camp), but it
appears that Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Marshall all may have identified the implications for
affirmative action as a potential concern in Palmore.
144 See 448 U.S. at 492-54 (affirming, in a fractured set of opinions, the constitutionality of a
federal set-aside for minority businesses).
145 See Neal Devins, Affirmative Action After Reagan, 68 TEX. L. REV. 353, 354 (1989) (contrasting the affirmative action initiatives instituted during the Carter Administration with Reagan’s
emphasis on equal opportunity without “inherently discriminatory” requirements).
146 467 U.S. 561, 578-83 (1984) (holding that the district court had improperly modified an
existing consent decree to require race-based deviations from an otherwise applicable seniority
system, despite the fact that the district court action was intended to preserve recent black hiring
gains). See generally GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 10-43 (2000)
(surveying the development of the Court’s reasoning in affirmative action decisions from the 1950s
through the 1980s).
147 See infra notes 149-150 and accompanying text (describing the Solicitor General’s arguments in favor of the petitioners).
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recent gains in the hiring of black firefighters.148 Filing on the side of the
white workers, Solicitor General Lee’s brief contended that Title VII
broadly precluded the district court’s action—and the use of race generally
to favor minority workers—except where those workers were specifically
identified victims of discrimination.149 More ominously (from the perspective of the Court’s race liberals), the Solicitor General’s brief also suggested
that the disputed action in Stotts—by benefitting nonvictim minority
employees—might violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth
Amendment.150
Four months later, this “suggestion” in Stotts would become an explicit
argument in the case of Bratton v. City of Detroit.151 Bratton involved the City
of Detroit’s voluntary adoption of racial targets for hiring and promoting
black officers on its police force, an effort undertaken after decades of racial
discrimination within the Department.152 White police officers had challenged the affirmative action program on both statutory and constitutional
grounds, contending that the program’s explicit use of racial criteria violated
Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.153 In December 1983, after losing
in the Sixth Circuit, the white officers petitioned for certiorari review by
the Supreme Court.154
In a move widely perceived as a victory for the anti-affirmative action
faction within the Reagan Administration, the Solicitor General’s office
filed a brief supporting the white police officers’ request for certiorari
review.155 Marking the first time that the Administration had argued directly
148 Stotts, 467 U.S. at 565-67. The consent decree had provided for hiring targets of minority
workers, but had not disrupted the seniority-based rules for layoffs. The district court modified the
consent decree to avoid the possibility that straight seniority layoffs would wipe out the recent
hiring gains of minority workers under the consent decree.
149 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11-29, Stotts, 467
U.S. 561 (Nos. 82-206, 82-229).
150 Id. at 29-31 (“[T]he court of appeals’ holding raises the issue of constitutionality of a race
conscious order under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.”).
151 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984), abrogated by Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
152 Id. at 882, 888-90.
153 Id. at 881.
154 See id. at 884, 897-98 (rejecting the officers’ Title VII and constitutional claims); see also
Robert Pear, U.S. Attacks Plan that Sets Quotas for Hiring Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1983, at 1
(describing the government’s brief urging Supreme Court review and arguing against the hiring
and promotion plan).
155 See, e.g., Pear, supra note 154 (“The filing of the brief indicated that . . . [the] Assistant
Attorney General for civil rights[] had prevailed within the Administration over people . . . who
had argued that race-conscious affirmative action plans were legal and constitutional.”); see also
Robert Pear, Administration Is Hoping to Force Court to Confront Racial Quotas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
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to the Court that affirmative action was unconstitutional, the brief contended
broadly that voluntary affirmative action plans employing explicit racial
criteria violated the Equal Protection Clause.156 Moreover, the Administration contended that this was so even in cases such as Bratton, where such
affirmative action plans were undertaken in response to “undeniable past
discrimination against blacks.”157 The position staked out by the administration in Bratton—that voluntary affirmative action, even where designed to
address past racial discrimination by the state itself, was constitutionally
impermissible—was thus on the far extremes of the affirmative action
debates.158
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the Reagan Administration’s brief
in Palmore—filed days after its Bratton brief—was greeted with some
suspicion by the Court’s race liberals.159 On its face, the brief (filed in
support of Linda Palmore) appeared to contain little that could arouse the
Court’s race liberals’ ire. The fundamental position the brief expressed—
that the lower court’s use of interracial marriage to deprive Linda Palmore
of custody was constitutionally invalid—was one with which the Court’s
race liberals (and indeed, ultimately all of its Justices) agreed.160 Moreover,
nowhere did the brief explicitly suggest that the lower court’s actions—
relying on the child’s “best interests” to transfer custody away from a white
woman—could be considered akin to affirmative action.
But, read in the context of the Administration’s mounting campaign
against affirmative action, it is not difficult to see how some of the Justices
saw the brief in a different, fundamentally less innocuous, light. Read in
light of that campaign, the Administration’s argument in Palmore that “[t]he
Equal Protection Clause does not ‘protect’ certain racial classes to the
exclusion of others; it protects all persons from invidious racial classification” must have appeared to the Justices directed less at the possibility that
black parents who married interracially might be subject to the same rules
1983, at B13 (describing the brief as a “translat[ion of] the Administration’s political campaign
against affirmative action”); Philip Perlmutter, Op-Ed., A New Kind of Discrimination, BOS.
GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1984, at A19.
156 See Pear, supra note 154.
157 Id.; see also Bratton, 704 F.2d at 888-90 (affirming a finding of a history of discrimination
against black police officers in Detroit).
158 See generally Pear, supra note 154.
159 Compare id.(dating the filing of the Administration’s Bratton brief as Friday, December 2,
1983), with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429 (1984) (No. 82-1734) (filed on Friday, Dec. 9, 1983).
160 Brief for the United States, supra note 159, at 7-9; see also Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434 (“The
effects of racial prejudice . . . cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the
custody of its natural mother . . . .”).
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and more to the broader question of whether the race of the victim “matters” in equal protection adjudication.161 Similarly, the Administration’s
exhortation that “[a] racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid” must have seemed targeted less at the best
interest of the child argument in Palmore and more to the wider debates
over “benign” motivations in race law.162
Thus, while the Court’s race liberals (and ultimately all of its Justices)
supported the result urged by the Solicitor General in Palmore, a number of
them were deeply skeptical of the reasoning proposed in the Administration’s amicus brief. Indeed, Justice Stevens—who alone among the Justices
appears to have been concerned both about the affirmative action and the
adoption implications of Palmore—went so far as to urge that the Justices
avoid the potential implications of the Solicitor General’s reasoning by
eschewing an equal protection rationale altogether.163 Instead, Justice
Stevens urged that the Court rely on the due process reasoning that the
Court had expressed in Stanley v. Illinois, an approach that at least one other
Justice, Justice Blackmun, appears to have been prepared to endorse.164
While ultimately Stevens’s proposal did not obtain significant support
among the other Justices, it appears to have been reflective of a broader
feeling that the Solicitor General’s approach was intended to—and could in
fact—bleed into the Court’s ongoing affirmative action debates.165
161
162
163

Brief of the United States, supra note 159, at 9.
Id. at 8 (quoting Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
See Brennan Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135 (noting for Justice Stevens, “I think its [sic] quite appropriate in writing the opinion that we not follow SG approach—
better is BRW’s due process approach in Stanley v. Illinois”); Blackmun Conference Notes,
Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135 (noting for Justice Stevens, “[D]o n[ot] buy SG’s broad approach.
Stanley v. Ill [illegible] is + way, ie, DP, n[ot] EP”). Interestingly, at least one Justice’s notes
connect Justice Stevens’ preference for Due Process instead to his concerns over adoption. See
Powell Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135 (noting for Justice Stevens, “Stanley v.
Ill due process rationale is preferred analysis. If we rely on E/P we might prejudge adoption”).
164 Id.; see also Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notation on First Draft of Burger Opinion,
No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers)
(Mar. 15, 1984) (noting, “Prefer DP, n[ot] EP Stanley v. Ga?”); Blackmun Conference Notes,
Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135 (showing a check mark next to Stevens’ recorded remarks
regarding the preferability of relying on the Stanley v. Illinois approach). See generally Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (invalidating a statutory provision that presumed unwed fathers were
unfit parents on equal protection and due process grounds).
165 See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text; see also Bench Memorandum on No. 821734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to Thurgood Marshall 5 n.3 (Feb. 22, 1984) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers) (“An ulterior motive for the SG’s brief seeking to strike
down the racially discriminatory ruling of the Florida Court may be the SG’s desire to emphasize
the point that racial considerations are illicit in all contexts—including the affirmative action
context.”); cf. Brief for the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9-14, Palmore,
466 U.S. 429 (No. 82-1734) (relying on colorblindness rhetoric and affirmative action precedents
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Ultimately, however, the opinion drafted by Chief Justice Burger in Palmore would not strongly implicate either of these sets of concerns. As Justice
Blackmun’s law clerk observed, the reasoning of the initial draft was “difficult to get much [of] a handle on.” Thus, the Burger draft employed fairly
sweeping rhetoric about the racial harm being remedied while couching its
holding in terms that had ambiguous salience for other legal contexts.166 As
a result, none of the Justices apparently felt their previously expressed
concerns were sufficiently implicated by Burger’s draft to warrant a request
for revisions (although one internal notation suggests that those concerns
remained at the time the draft was circulated).167
Indeed, only Justice Brennan—concerned that the opinion could be read
to permit the use of race where it was only a partial (as opposed to dispositive) consideration—raised any dispute at all regarding the reasoning that
Chief Justice Burger employed in his initial draft.168 And when the Chief
Justice responded that a narrow holding was indeed warranted—and made
only minor modifications to his draft—even Justice Brennan nevertheless
joined.169 Thus, the Court’s final ruling, issued on April 25, 1984, was
to argue that the use of race in Palmore was invalid, but specifically noting that the use of race in
remedial contexts should be treated differently).
166 Memorandum from E.T. on No. 72-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to Harry A. Blackmun (Mar.
16, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers); see also First Draft of
Burger Opinion, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti 5-6 (Mar. 15, 1984) (on file with the Library of
Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (stating that the Constitution cannot tolerate prejudice,
but offering little guidance on how to apply that principle outside the context of the specific facts
of the case).
167 See generally Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 402, Folder 11 (showing no mention, in the
circulated memoranda on file, of a request by any of the Justices to revise Justice Burger’s draft due
to affirmative action or adoption concerns); see also Handwritten Notation on First Draft of Burger
Opinion, supra note 166, at 1 (querying internally, “[S]h[oul]d th[ere] b[e] a reservation w[ith]
r[espect] t[o] adoption? [P]refer DP, n[ot] EP Stanley v. Ga?”).
168 See Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr., on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to
Warren E. Burger (Mar. 20, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Papers) (suggesting changes to the opinion that would clarify that race cannot be used as a
consideration in any respect in the child custody context, even when such consideration is not
dispositive); see also Memorandum from E.T., supra note 166 (noting shortly prior to Brennan’s
memorandum that “that there is some discussion about encouraging the CJ to make this opinion
stronger—to make clear that race not only cannot be the dispositive factor, but that it is an
impermissible consideration in a child custody termination proceeding”); Handwritten Notation
on First Draft of Burger Opinion, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti 5 (Mar. 15, 1984) (on file with the
Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (noting that the passage prohibiting race
from being a “dispositive” consideration should be changed to preclude race “in any respect
whatever be[ing] a” basis for a denial of custody).
169 See Memorandum from Warren E. Burger on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to William
J. Brennan, Jr. (Mar. 21, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Papers) (explaining the rationale behind a narrow holding); see also Second Draft of Burger
Opinion, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti 3 (Apr. 19, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress,
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unanimous in favor of Linda Palmore, bearing no external signs of the
internal concerns that the case had initially aroused.170
III. PALMORE TO ADARAND: 1985–1995
The next ten years—from 1985 to 1995—would mark a turning point in
both affirmative action case law and race family law in the United States. In
the affirmative action context, the Court’s constitutional standards for
reviewing affirmative action—still arguably hospitable to the race liberals’
preferred intermediate scrutiny standard at the time that Palmore was
decided—would turn first tentatively, and then decisively, toward strict
scrutiny review.171 Thus, in 1986 the Court would issue a decision in which
four of the Justices publicly called for strict scrutiny review (a view that
many of the still-serving race conservatives had privately expressed as early
as Bakke), with a fifth declining to publicly endorse a standard.172 And by
mid-1989, the Court had decisively held that all state and local government
uses of race must be subjected to strict scrutiny; a holding extended, after
initial equivocation, to the federal government in 1995.173 Thus the decade
between 1985 and 1995 marked a dramatic change in the Court’s affirmative
action precedents, away from the fractured opinions that characterized the
late 1970s and early 1980s (opinions at least partially favorable to the
position of the Court’s race liberals) to a solid majority in favor of applying

William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (maintaining the narrow holding from the original draft);
Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr., on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to Chief Justice
Burger (Apr. 20, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers)
(agreeing to join the Chief Justice’s opinion).
170 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
171 At the time that Palmore was decided, the Court had decided three significant cases on
“benign” uses of race: United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc.(UJO) v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); and Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980). In each of these cases, there was no majority opinion regarding the proper
standard of scrutiny to be applied, and a plurality of Justices articulated support for something less
than strict scrutiny. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 517-21 (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall, &Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring); UJO, 430 U.S. at 148-65 (plurality opinion).
172 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to the use of race in the context of layoff decisions regarding public school
teachers); id. at 295 (White, J., concurring).
173 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring) (making clear that strict scrutiny must be applied to
“benign” state and local government uses of race); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995) (applying the same standard to the federal government and overruling in relevant
part Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
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the most stringent standard of constitutional review even to “benign” uses
of race.
This turn—perceived at the time as a major upheaval in the Court’s race
law jurisprudence174—was justified by the Court primarily through two core
rhetorical arguments. First, while continuing to facially recognize that
certain racial classifications might be justified by compelling circumstances,
by the mid-1990s the Court spoke far more often in terms of the inherent
harms of government uses of race.175 Thus, the majority decisions for the
Court during this time period began to refer to all racial classifications—
including those intended to benefit racial minorities—in broadly negative
terms, characterizing such classifications as “pernicious,” “odious,” and
“stigmatiz[ing].”176 While continuing to pay lip service to the notion that
strict scrutiny was intended to “smoke out” invidious uses of race, the Court
in fact turned toward an understanding in which government uses of race
may be justified by compelling objectives, but are always fundamentally
non-benign.177 This rhetorical turn, which would take on an even more
strident form in some of the later opinions authored by the Court’s race
conservatives, provided the Court with its fundamental normative justification for treating affirmative action as constitutionally akin to invidious uses
of race.178
174 For news articles discussing the significance of Adarand and Croson, see Joan Biskupic,
Court’s Conservatives Make Presence Felt: Reagan Appointees Lead Move Rightward, WASH. POST,
July 2, 1995, at A1 (describing the Court’s decision in Adarand and other 1994 Term decisions as
“finally deliver[ing]” on Ronald Reagan’s anti-affirmative action agenda and “set[ting] in motion a
rollback of federal affirmative action programs”); Linda Greenhouse, Court Bars a Plan Set Up to
Provide Jobs to Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1989, at A1 (describing how the Croson ruling “cast
constitutional doubt on a wide variety of government hiring and contract programs to aid
minorities”); David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rulings Herald Rehnquist Era, L.A. TIMES, July 2,
1995, at A1 (stating that the Adarand ruling “puts in jeopardy every federal program that explicitly
uses race as a criterion for awarding contracts or jobs”).
175 See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-24, 229, 236 (characterizing race-based distinctions as
“odious” and “inherently suspect” (citations omitted)); id. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) (“[T]here can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended
consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination.”); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (“Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race ‘are by their
very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’”
(citations omitted)); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94, 500 (“Classifications based on race carry a danger
of stigmatic harm.”); id. at 521, 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing the view that all racial
classifications are inherently malign).
176 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-24, 229, 236 (citations omitted); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643.
177 But see Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (reiterating that the purpose of strict scrutiny is to “smoke
out” invidious uses of race).
178 See supra notes 175-77; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1
(PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 721, 745-48 (2007) (drawing on Brown to argue that public school policies
intended to promote integration were constitutionally impermissible, and characterizing the use of
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The Court buttressed these normative claims of inherent invidiousness
with related claims of “consistency” (i.e., claims that the Court must treat
all racial classifications the same).179 “[A]ll racial classifications,” the Court
increasingly claimed, “must be strictly scrutinized” by the courts.180 In other
words, racial classifications of any kind “are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.”181
Thus, in the late 1980s and 1990s, the Court turned away from the notion of
contextual variability toward a claim of global consistency, requiring the
most stringent form of scrutiny for all government uses of race.182 And
although this rhetorical theme emerged primarily as a normative explanation for why the claims of white plaintiffs should be treated the same as the
claims of racial minorities, it would ultimately evolve into a broad descriptive claim and doctrinal mandate to which the Court itself would claim
adherence.183
Both of these core justifications for the Court’s increasingly stringent review
of affirmative action programs—inherent invidiousness and cross-contextual
consistency—arguably should have had profound implications for the use of
race in family law. For although, in the aftermath of Palmore, the lower
courts did largely cease to award custody modifications based on interracial
marriages;184 they typically construed Palmore as having relatively little
importance for other ongoing uses of race.185

racial classifications as “odious,” “promot[ing] ‘notions of racial inferiority,’” “contributing to an
escalation of racial hostility and conflict,” and “demean[ing to] the dignity and worth of a person”
(citations omitted)); id. at 751-52, 758, 778-82 (Thomas, J., concurring) (comparing the dissent’s
arguments in favor of the consideration of race as a means of promoting integration to the
segregationist states’ arguments in Brown and to the “elite[]” racial theories at issue in Dred Scott
and Plessy); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[E]very time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes
race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”).
179 See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224; see also Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643.
180 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (emphasis added).
181 Id. at 227.
182 See id. at 224, 227; see also Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643.
183 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224, 227; see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411,
2417-19 (2013); PICS, 551 U.S. at 720, 739 n.16, 741-42; id. at 751-52, 758-59, 778-82 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
184 See, e.g., Turman v. Boleman, 510 S.E.2d 532 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (holding a child custody
decree that prohibited the child’s contact with African American males void, and barring the
husband from withholding visitation to the mother based on her marriage to an African American
man); Holt v. Chenault, 722 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1987) (holding that the impact of a mother’s
subsequent biracial marriage is an inappropriate basis for custody modification); Elliott v. Boyes,
13 Phila. 273, 283, 283 n.5 (Phil. Cnty. Ct. 1985) (finding stepfather’s race irrelevant where there
was no evidence that his race had adversely affected the children); see also KENNEDY, supra note 7,
at 385-86. But cf. Dansby v. Dansby, 189 S.W.3d 473 (Ark Ct. App. 2004) (disapproving of the trial
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As a result, Palmore did not eradicate the continuing use of race in adoption and foster care, nor in custody disputes between interracial parents.
Instead, the continued use of race in those contexts was largely deemed
acceptable by the courts, except where the facts evidenced an exclusive
reliance on racial criteria (a limitation with which only the most unsophisticated government actor would be unable to demonstrate compliance).
Indeed, courts addressing post-Palmore, race-based family law practices
typically found them to be categorically constitutional (i.e., requiring no
constitutional scrutiny of any kind) where race was not the exclusive factor
considered as part of the best interest of the child assessment.
This approach, while perhaps consistent with a narrow reading of Palmore,
was in obvious tension with the Court’s post-Palmore affirmative action
court’s reliance on the race of the mother’s partner in awarding change of custody, but nevertheless
affirming on other grounds).
185 See, e.g., J.H.H. v. O’Hara, 878 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990)
(declining to read Palmore as a broad proscription against the consideration of race in matters of
child custody and foster care placement); Tallman v. Tabor, 859 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
(holding that “[i]t appears well-settled in the case law” that race can be a factor in child placement
so long as it is not the only factor); In re Petition of D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316 (D.C. 1985) (declining to
intrude “into the trial court’s exercise of discretion in inter-racial adoption cases” because in such
cases, “there is no need to reach the constitutional issue of equal protection”); Gloria G. v. State
Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 833 P.2d 979 (Kan. 1992) (finding that race could be used as a
factor in adoption decisions so long as it is not the sole factor); In re Adoption/Guardianship No.
2633, 646 A.2d 1036, 1047-49 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (finding that the use of race as a factor
was constitutionally permissible, but that exclusive reliance on race was not; but also finding no
error in rejecting prospective adoptive parents’ claims, despite lower court finding that race was
the “sole criterion”); Carlson v. County of Hennepin, 428 N.W.2d 453, 455, 458 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1023 (1989) (holding that qualified immunity barred a claim in a case
where a white couple was told that it was “against county policy to allow a white couple to adopt a
black child”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. 27a-28a, In re Welfare of D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375
(Minn. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1000 (1992) (No. 92-616) (reproducing lower court decision,
which had concluded that Minnesota’s race-matching statute was “likely not subject to . . . strict
scrutiny” “[s]ince it addresses substantial problems arising out of the realities that Minnesota is
more than 90% white” and was designed to “ensure the best interests of children are met by
requiring due consideration of the child’s minority race”); Memorandum from J.B. on No. 90-123CSX, Wilson v. Darrow, to the Cert Pool 1-4 (Aug. 10, 1990) (on file with the Blackmun Digital
Archive) (noting, in a certiorari memorandum describing the lower courts’ decisions, that the
lower courts had found that although exclusive reliance on race was impermissible, race as a factor
was constitutional, and that this was consistent with the consensus of the courts of appeals). But cf.
McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (granting a preliminary injunction and
finding that the removal of a foster child violates equal protection where race was the sole basis for
the removal), aff ’d on other grounds, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Marriage of Brown, 480
N.E.2d 246, 247-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting the notion that race could be a factor in a
custody dispute based on Palmore); In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(requiring strict scrutiny where race was the sole factor in adoption determination). See generally
Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. REV. 145, 169-70 (1994) (observing, similarly, that Palmore did
not eradicate the use of race in family law).
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doctrine.186 Both of the Court’s key justifications for its new affirmative
action doctrine—the inherent invidiousness of all uses of race and the need
for consistency across all race-based decisionmaking contexts—facially
demanded the application of strict scrutiny to all government uses of race,187
even where race was not the exclusive consideration.188 And indeed, many of
the race-based family law decisions that courts confronted during this time
gave, either formally or de facto, at least as much weight to racial considerations as the affirmative action policies that the Court had found to require
strict scrutiny (with predictable results for their constitutional validity).189
Thus, the Court’s affirmative action precedents during this time frame
should have profoundly unsettled the lower courts’ approach to the remaining instantiations of race in family law (adoption, foster care, and interracial
parent custody disputes). But while 1985 to 1995 was a time of considerable
change for race in family law doctrine (like affirmative action), this change
was not in the direction one would expect. Between 1985 and 1995, rather
than moving toward a consensus against the use of race in family law, the
lower courts increasingly expressed a consensus that remaining uses of race

186 As discussed, Palmore was written narrowly by Chief Justice Burger precisely to leave
open the possibility of using race as a factor in future family law cases. See supra notes 135, 168-69
and accompanying text.
187 All of these race-based family law cases involved state action, as defined for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes, in the form of race-based action by a state agency, race-based adjudication,
or a state statute mandating the application of race-based criteria. I am aware of no case in which
the absence of state action was the basis for rejecting the litigant’s equal protection arguments.
188 The view that even using race as a factor requires strict scrutiny was articulated in the
affirmative action context by a number of the Court’s race conservatives as early as Bakke (in
internal memoranda) and was ultimately codified explicitly by the Court in its affirmative action
case law. See, e.g., Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, to the Conference 1-4 (Jan. 3, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry
A. Blackmun Papers) (expressing the view in that in the affirmative action context, even use of
race as a factor demanded strict scrutiny); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (affirming strict scrutiny
as the appropriate standard for a case involving a “race as a factor” admissions process); cf. Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977) (recognizing that, even
where an unconstitutional consideration is merely one factor, it is constitutionally problematic if it
is the dispositive factor).
189 Compare J.H.H., 878 F.2d at 242-43 (affirming the dismissal of claims relating to the removal of African American children from a foster home pursuant to a policy requiring placement
of minority children with families of “similar racial and ethnic characteristics”) and Reisman v.
Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 843 F. Supp. 356, 365 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (addressing the issue of
race-matching in foster care and adoption and ordering categorically that “bi-racial children shall
be placed in foster homes and in adoptive homes with bi-racial families, if possible”), with
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205-09, 235-37 (applying strict scrutiny to a program in which race was one
factor, but not the only consideration) and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270-73,
283-84 (1986) (invalidating a layoff policy in which race and seniority were both considerations
with four Justices endorsing the application of strict scrutiny).
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in the family were constitutionally permissible.190 And while the courts were
never completely unified, either in outcome or in approach, by the 1990s,
most courts were expressing the view that only de minimis (if any) constitutional scrutiny was demanded of race-based family law practices, at least
where race was not the exclusive consideration.191 As such, the decade
between 1985 and 1995—unlike the preceding decade—was marked by
increasing consistency in both the outcome and the reasoning of the courts’
approaches to government uses of race in the family; but in ways that
diverged profoundly from both the framework adopted (strict scrutiny) and
the usual results (invalidation) in the affirmative action context during the
same time frame.
Five of the disputes arising during this time frame—all involving racebased adoption or foster care determinations—prompted the litigants
involved to seek Supreme Court intervention in these continuing race-based
family law practices. First in 1988 and then again in 1989, 1990, 1992, and
1994, disappointed would-be parents petitioned the Court to address state
policies and practices that had resulted in the removal of African American

190 See, e.g., J.H.H., 878 F.2d 240; Tallman v. Tabor, 859 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Mich. 1994);
DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Pa. 1991); In re Petition of D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316
(D.C. 1985); Gloria G., 833 P.2d 979; Wilson v. Darrow (Ky. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
851 (1990); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d 1036 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); In re
Welfare of D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1000 (1992); Carlson v.
County of Hennepin, 428 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); cf. Reisman, 843 F. Supp. at 363-66
(finding a violation of equal protection where an agency race-matched biracial children with black
parents, but ordering instead that “bi-racial children shall be placed in foster homes and in
adoptive homes with bi-racial families”—i.e., that they should be even more specifically racematched); Child v. Stangler, No. 92-0850, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19954, at *7-8 (W.D. Mo. Dec.
28, 1992) (stating that it is “by no means clear” that race-matching in adoption is constitutionally
impermissible, but basing holding on abstention grounds); Lee v. Halayko, 590 N.Y.S.2d 647
(App. Div. 1992) (stating that the use of race in custody disputes between interracial parents is
generally appropriate, but finding that here it did not tip the balance in favor of the minority
parent); In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (disapproving the use of race as a
sole consideration in adoption, but approving its use generally). See generally Rhonda Hillbery,
“Baby D” Foster Parents in Court Again—Judge Reverses Decision to Allow Adoption of Black Child,
STAR TRIB., Sept. 6, 1994, at 1A (describing an adoption case in which the judge reversed a prior
decision granting a private adoption based on a state race-matching statute).
191 See, e.g., Tallman, 859 F. Supp. at 1085-88; In re D.I.S., 494 A.2d at 1326-27; Wilson (Ky.
Ct. App. 1989); In re D.L., 486 N.W.3d at 375; cf. DeWees, 779 F. Supp. at 26-29 (approving racematching based on common-sense norms, but nominally applying strict scrutiny); McLaughlin v.
Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 323-24 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (applying rigorous constitutional scrutiny where
race was the sole factor considered), aff ’d on other grounds, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989); In re
Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d at 785-88 (same). But cf. In re Marriage of Brown, 480 N.E.2d 246, 247-48
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (applying meaningful constitutional scrutiny to an interracial child custody
dispute, even though race was not the sole consideration).

578

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 537

or biracial children from their homes.192 Arguing that the courts below had
carved out an exception for state-sponsored “segregation” in the family, the
litigants in each case contended that the lower courts had lost touch with
the Court’s broader race law jurisprudence.193 Often drawing explicitly on
the Court’s affirmative action precedents, they called upon the Court to
remedy the lower courts’ aberrational approach and to strike down the
continuing use of race in the adoption and foster care contexts.194
But the Court showed no more interest in taking up the issues of adoption or foster care during the 1985 to 1995 time frame than it had at the time
that Palmore was decided. While the record of the Justices’ personal views of
the cases that came up to the Court during this time is sparse, none of the
five cases appears to have been perceived as a serious candidate for review.
Indeed, in most of the cases for which internal Court records are available,
192 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4-8, J.H.H. v. O’Hara, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990) (No. 89906) [hereinafter J.H.H. Petition] (arguing that review should be granted of a race-based fostercare determination due to its inconsistency with the Courts’ race law precedents); Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at *11-13, Wilson v. Darrow, 498 U.S. 851 (1990) (No. 90-123) [hereinafter Wilson
Petition] (arguing that the defendant’s “automatic, race-based exclusion of prospective adoptive
parents” lacked the “extraordinary justification” required by the Court’s race law precedents);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Mauk v. Engle, 516 U.S. 809 (1995) (No. 94-1876) [hereinafter
Mauk Petition] (asserting that race-based removal of an African American foster child from the
care of white foster parents violated the Equal Protection Clause); Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at *13-17, Sharp v. Hennepin County, 506 U.S. 1000 (1992) (No. 92-616) [hereinafter Sharp
Petition] (arguing that review should be granted to “reaffirm the Constitutional proscription
against racial segregation” in the context of race-matching in adoption); see also Memorandum
from M.S. on No. 88-6265-CSX, Carlson v. County of Hennepin, to the Cert Pool at 9-10 (1989)
[hereinafter Carlson Memo] (on file with the Blackmun Digital Archive) (describing the Carlson
Petition, which sought certiorari review of an adoption decision based on Minnesota’s racematching statute).
193 J.H.H. Petition, supra note 192, at 4-5; Wilson Petition, supra note 192, at 11-15; Sharp Petition, supra note 192, at 10, 13-18 (describing the County defendant as having encouraged “racial
segregation” in removing a black foster child pursuant to Minnesota Minority Heritage Child
Protection Act); Mauk Petition, supra note 192, at 12-24; see also Carlson Memo, supra note 192, at 910.
194 See, e.g., Mauk Petition, supra note 192, at 12-24 (drawing, inter alia, on affirmative action
case law to call for the Court to intervene and address the lower courts’ approach to race family
law issues); Sharp Petition, supra note 192, at 13-18 (arguing that the Court should take up the issue
of race-matching in adoption since the “race-based decisionmaking of the courts throughout the
country is in conflict with this Court’s fundamental rulings”); J.H.H. Petition, supra note 192, at 45 (arguing that the Court should grant certiorari to “lay to rest the sinister suggestion raised in
this case that state sponsored racial segregation may somehow be countenanced in a democratic
society”); Wilson Petition, supra note 192, at 11-15 (drawing on affirmative action case law in arguing
that the Court should intervene and address the issue of race-matching in adoption); see also Brief
of Respondent in Support of Petition at 6-16, J.H.H., 493 U.S. 1072 (No. 89-906) (same); Carlson
Memo, supra note 192, at 9-10 (summarizing the Petitioners’ arguments that Carlson County
“practices impermissible racial discrimination . . . that the state c[ou]rts have condoned this
practice[,] . . . and that it will continue unless this C[our]t acts by granting this pet[itio]n”).
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those records suggest that the case at issue never even made it to the
Justices’ so-called “discuss list,” signifying that not a single Justice thought
discussion of the case was warranted as a potential matter for the Court to
take up.195 And while several of the cases arguably had procedural complications that made them unappealing candidates for certiorari, at least one was,
in the words of Justice Blackmun’s law clerk, “extraordinary,” involving a
lower court decision that had denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to
demonstrate that even the sole use of race to deny a foster care placement
violated their clearly established constitutional rights.196 Nevertheless, even
this “extraordinary” case appears not to have attracted any serious attention,
and ultimately each of the cases would be denied certiorari review.
IV. ADARAND TO GAMBLA: 1996–2007
While the Court thus declined during the post-Palmore period to become involved in the ongoing constitutional disputes over the propriety of
the use of race in adoption and foster care, statutory changes in the mid1990s would ultimately limit the practical significance of this inaction. In
1994, Congress enacted (and shortly thereafter amended) the Howard M.
Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994 (MEPA).197 In its final
form (adopted in 1996), MEPA precluded the use of race as a basis for
“delay[ing]” or “deny[ing]” foster care or adoption placements by most state

195 See Docket Sheet, No. 92-616, Sharp v. Hennepin County (on file with the Library of
Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) (showing no individual vote on Sharp); Docket Sheet, No.
90-123, Wilson v. Darrow (on file with the Blackmun Digital Archive) (showing no individual vote
on Wilson); Docket Sheet, No. 89-906, J.H.H. v. O’Hara (on file with the Library of Congress,
Thurgood Marshall Papers) (showing no individual vote on J.H.H.); Docket Sheet, No. 88-6265,
Carlson v. County of Hennepin (on file with the Blackmun Digital Archive) (showing no votes in
favor of granting certiorari in Carlson). See generally Songying Fang, Timothy R. Johnson & Jason
M. Roberts, The Will of the Minority: The Rule of Four on the United States Supreme Court 18
(Oct. 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~sf5/Fang/
Assistant_Professor_files/rule4_fa07_fang.pdf (noting that only those cases that are on the discuss
list are voted on at conference).
196 Annotation of M.S. on Memorandum from S.C., Law Clerk, on No. 89-906-CFX,
J.H.H. v. O’Hara, to the Cert Pool 8 (Jan. 25, 1990) (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry
A. Blackmun Papers); see also J.H.H., 878 F.2d at 243 (noting that the determination in J.H.H. was
made pursuant to a policy that “[m]inority children shall be placed with families of similar racial
and ethnic characteristics”).
197 Pub. L. 103-382 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994)) (prior to 1996 amendment); see also
Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 32-34 (2008) (discussing the history behind
MEPA).
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actors, thus achieving by statute much of what litigants had long sought
(unsuccessfully) to institutionalize as a matter of constitutional law.198
Federal enforcement efforts were reportedly weak, and noncompliance
rampant, in the initial time frame after MEPA’s enactment. But by the
mid-to-late 2000s, it appears that MEPA had wrought real, albeit not
universal, changes in state adoption and foster care practices.199 Indeed, a
number of states that had statutes explicitly requiring race-matching in
adoption or foster care modified their statutory law following MEPA to, at
least ostensibly, preclude such practices.200 As a result, by the mid-2000s it
had become significantly more rare for public institutions (and courts) to
rely explicitly on race in adoption or foster care determinations, a decline
that is reflected in the case law.201
198 Maldonado, supra note 197, at 32-34; see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18) (2006 & Supp. V
2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(1) (1996). Section 671(a)(18) explicitly applies only to those states and
entities receiving federal funds. Section 1996b(1) is written in ostensibly categorical terms, but
provides for enforcement only via Title VI, a spending clause statute. Since the overwhelming
majority of state agencies receive federal funding, see Katie Eyer, Rehabilitation Act Redux, 23 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 282-87 (2005), MEPA’s restrictions thus extend, at a minimum, to the vast
majority of public agencies, as well as to those private agencies receiving federal funds.
199 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Correspondence, Private Race Preferences in Family Formation,
107 YALE L.J. 2351, 2353-54 (1998) (noting that as of 1998, MEPA had had little effect due to
deeply entrenched professional preferences for race-matching and weak enforcement); Meyer,
supra note 11, at 195-207 (describing the Department of Health and Human Services’ new
aggressive enforcement approach to MEPA).
200 Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (1991) (requiring placement agencies to place
minority children in same-race placements, except where a placement with a relative was
available), with MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.57, 260C.212 (2007) (collectively prohibiting the state
from “delay[ing]” or “deny[ing]” foster care or adoption placements based on race).
201 The effects of MEPA can be seen both in the number and the substance of cases brought
in the post-1995 period. Numerically, adoption cases have become much less common in the case
law, particularly since the mid-2000s. Substantively, post-MEPA adoption cases increasingly
involve the refusal of courts or agencies to afford greater weight to race, a claim that is often
rejected on the basis of MEPA or its state law analogs. See, e.g., In re Malik S., 1999 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 1178, at *16-17 n.5 (May 5, 1999) (recognizing the difficulties “in growing up as a child of
mixed race living with white parents” but approving the placement on the basis of MEPA and the
child’s best interests); In re F.W., 870 A.2d 82, 86-87 (D.C. 2005) (“We disagree . . . with . . . [the]
contention[] that the trial court failed to weigh adequately the issues of race, culture, and gender
in reaching its determination.”); In re P.S., 797 A.2d 1219, 1225 (D.C. 2001) (concluding that “race
is simply a factor that may be considered . . . in the process of determining the best interests of the
child” and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give more weight to the
child’s race); In re D.T., No. A10-35, 2010 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 682, at *8-9 (July 13, 2010)
(rejecting a challenge to the child’s placement based on religious and cultural needs); In re D.C.,
No. A-1151-05T4, 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2620, at *6-7 (Apr. 25, 2006) (rejecting the
argument that the child should be placed with a relative that would foster ethnic, racial, or cultural
identity and noting that “the race of the foster/adoptive parents is not and cannot be a disqualifying factor” under MEPA); In re Maximus H., No. B-07428-07, 2009 N.Y. LEXIS 3371, *3-5 (Fam.
Ct. Dec. 10, 2009) (considering matters of racial and cultural identity but refusing to remove the
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MEPA’s changes, however, were explicitly limited to the adoption and
foster care context and did not reach the courts’ continued use of race in
custody disputes between interracial parents. Such custody disputes—while
always less common than adoption disputes—had traditionally employed
very similar reasoning to that used in the adoption and foster care context.202 Thus, the courts had typically permitted the use of race as a dispositive factor in interracial custody disputes (on the grounds that the minority
parent would be better situated to meet a biracial child’s emotional needs),
most often without any meaningful constitutional scrutiny.203 Indeed, such
courts, like courts faced with racial practices in the adoption and foster care
context, often held that where race was not the exclusive consideration in
the best interest analysis, no constitutional scrutiny was required at all. That
reasoning—untouched by MEPA’s statutory changes—continued to evolve
little in the post-MEPA period, as most courts continued to affirm the
propriety of weighing race as a factor in interracial custody disputes.204
child from a foster family of another race and religion). But see Ralph Richard Banks, The
Multiethnic Placement Act and the Troubling Persistence of Race Matching, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 271,
284-85 (2009) (arguing that some agencies have simply moved to a regime of thinly veiled racematching, often under the rubric of “cultural competency”). Since MEPA was amended in 1996,
only two courts have addressed the constitutionality of relying on race in adoptive or foster care
placements, with opposite results. Compare In re Andrea Lynn Carpenter, No. 217634, 1999 Mich.
App. LEXIS 2140, at *8-10 & n.3 (Dec. 3, 1999) (finding the trial court’s reliance on race was
constitutionally unproblematic where race was not the sole consideration), with Kenny A. v.
Perdue, No. 02-1686, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27025, at *21-22 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2004) (allowing a
claim of unconstitutional racial discrimination, in a case where the circumstantial evidence
supported the conclusion that the agency had a virtually categorical policy of race-matching, to
survive summary judgment); cf. In re A.B., 663 N.W.2d 625, 634-36 (N.D. 2003) (rejecting an
equal protection challenge to the application of the ICWA to the adoption of Indian children),
cert. denied, 541 U.S. 972 (2004).
202 See infra note 203.
203 See, e.g., Raysor v. Gabbey, 395 N.Y.S.2d 290, 294-95 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that racial
considerations “should be a matter of first importance in weighing the child’s best interests” in a
custody dispute between an African American father and white grandparents); Ward v. Ward, 216
P.2d 755, 756 (Wash. 1950) (“These . . . victims of a mixed marriage . . . will have a much better
opportunity to take their rightful place in society if they are brought up among their own
people.”). But see Lee v. Halayko, 590 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (App. Div. 1992) (upholding the trial
court’s decision to place partially Chinese children with the non-Chinese parent on the grounds
that the non-Chinese parent was sufficiently culturally competent); Farmer v. Farmer, 109 Misc.
2d 137, 146-47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (surveying the case law and concluding that race should be
weighed as a factor but not a “dominant” or “controlling” one); Tucker v. Tucker, 542 P.2d 789
(Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (questioning the validity of Ward but nevertheless affirming that race can be
a factor in custody disputes between interracial parents). Only two cases have ever invalidated the
use of race in the interracial custody context on constitutional grounds. See In re Marriage of
Brown, 480 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Beazley v. Davis, 545 P.2d 206, 207-08 (Nev. 1976).
204 See, e.g., Gambla v. Woodson, 853 N.E.2d 847, 868-70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“[S]o long as
race is not the sole consideration for custody decisions, but only one of several factors, it is not an
unconstitutional consideration.”); Ebirim v. Ebirim, 620 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000)
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Thus, while racial factors were not always deemed dispositive in the circumstances of a particular case, courts called upon to adjudicate interracial
custody disputes during this time frame continued to regularly reaffirm the
legal validity of the use of race to determine a child’s best interests in
interracial custody disputes.
Exemplary of this continuing practice and the constitutional disputes
that it continued to engender, was the Illinois case of Gambla v. Woodson.205
Filed in 2003 in Illinois Circuit Court, Gambla v. Woodson was the product
of a brief and unhappy marriage between Christopher Gambla, a white
man, and Kimberly Woodson, an African American woman.206 At primary
issue in Gambla and Woodson’s divorce was custody of their one child—a
biracial baby daughter named Kira—for whom they both claimed to be the
primary caregiver.207 At trial, Gambla and Woodson would each introduce
an abundance of evidence in support of their custody claims, with four
experts and ten lay witnesses testifying over the course of the seventeen-day
trial.208 Race played an important role in the trial, with Woodson introducing expert testimony that Kira—as a biracial child—would be better served
by an award of custody to her African American mother.209
Despite this evidence—and the fact that many courts in similar circumstances had awarded custody to the minority parent—Christopher had
reason to be optimistic that race would not play a meaningful role in the
determination of Kira’s custody. Historically, Illinois had not been a solicitous jurisdiction for race-based family law decisionmaking, frequently
abandoning or limiting race-based family law rules long before other
jurisdictions did.210 Indeed, the Illinois Court of Appeals was the first court
in the country to invalidate a trial court’s race-based award of custody in a
dispute between interracial parents, finding in 1956 that an automatic

(“consider[ing] the impact of [the child’s] biracial heritage in light of all the relevant factors”);
Savage v. Cota, 885 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (“We reject the . . . contention that
the court relied too heavily on the child’s race in determining . . . custody.”); In re Davis, 658
N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (App. Div. 1997) (making clear that race can be considered as a factor, but
finding it was not dispositive in the case under review); Olivier A. v. Christina A., No. 3077912002
(Sup. Ct. Aug. 2005) (considering race as a factor, but finding it nondispositive).
205 Gambla, 853 N.E.2d 847.
206 Id. at 849.
207 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. 63a, 130a-32a, Gambla v. Woodson, 552 U.S. 1056
(2007) (No. 06-1193) (trial court opinion and expert report of Daniel J. Hynan, Ph.D.).
208 Id. at app. 63a (trial court opinion).
209 Id. at app. 68a.
210 See infra notes 211-12. Illinois also repealed its antimiscegenation law in 1874, long before
most other states had done so. Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving:
Reflections on the “Loving Analogy” for Same-Sex Marriage, 51 HOW. L.J. 117, 180 app. III (2007).
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race-based award to the minority parent was impermissible.211 And while
the Illinois courts had not, in the years since, issued a published decision
addressing the use of race to determine custody between interracial parents,
they had, in other contexts, repeatedly rejected lower court attempts to
inject race into family law decisionmaking.212 Thus, while Illinois law
arguably allowed the use of race as a factor in custody disputes (so long as it
was not dispositive), in practice, custody decisions resting on racial grounds
were rarely upheld.213
Moreover, in Kira’s case, it seemed that all factors other than race pointed
toward an award of custody to Christopher.214 Both of the custody experts
who had evaluated the family, including Kimberly’s own, voiced strong
opinions at trial that custody should be awarded to Christopher.215 Relying
in part on psychological testing and in part on Kimberly’s history of physical aggression in intimate relationships, both expressed concerns that

211 Fountaine v. Fountaine, 133 N.E.2d 532, 533-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956). For a case illustrative
of other courts’ approaches to this issue during the same time frame, see, for example, Ward v.
Ward, 216 P.2d 755, 756 (Wash. 1950), which held that biracial children should be raised by their
African American grandmother, rather than their white mother because “[t]hey will have a much
better opportunity to take their rightful place in society if they are brought up among their own
people.”
212 See, e.g., Langin v. Langin, 276 N.E.2d 822 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (reversing the trial court’s
custody decision for relying too heavily on the factor of race); Stingley v. Wesch, 222 N.E.2d 505,
507 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (finding that race should not be decisive in a custody dispute and that the
stepfather’s race had no significance in the proceeding).
213 But see Russell v. Russell, 399 N.E.2d 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (affirming the decision of a
trial court that had relied in part on the possibility of social stigmitazation as a result of the
mother’s interracial marriage, because its partial reliance did not overweigh other considerations
and was not decisive).
214 Aside from race, the factors that the trial court explicitly referenced were all found to
either be equal, or weigh in favor of Christopher. From a practical perspective, however, it is
certainly possible that Christopher’s sex (i.e., status as a father), also played a role, albeit a silent
one in the court’s decisionmaking. See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood:
Encouraging Divorced Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 967-75 (2005) (discussing the
possibility that fathers continue to be disadvantaged by informal social norms in custody disputes
despite the abolition of the tender years doctrine, but concluding that the evidence is mixed);
Steven N. Peskind, Determining the Undeterminable: The Best Interest of the Child Standard as an
Imperfect But Necessary Guidepost to Determine Child Custody, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 449, 465 & nn.
73 & 74 (2005) (noting that Illinois abolished its tender years doctrine as a violation of its state
Equal Rights Amendment in the 1970s).
215 See Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 851-54, 860-61 (outlining the evaluators’ reasons for recommending that Christopher receive custody); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 207, at app.
126a-64a (expert reports of Daniel J. Hynan, Ph.D., and Robert P. Hatcher, Ph.D.); see also
Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 872 (Byrne, J., concurring) (noting that Woodson selected one of the two
experts who testified that custody should be awarded to Gambla).
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Kimberly suffered from impulsivity and self-control problems.216 Both
experts also suggested that Kimberly—who embraced alternative medicine
approaches without scientific support and who had arguably ignored the
seriousness of her older son’s mental health problems—appeared to lack
judgment when it came to her children’s medical care.217 Finally, the experts
noted that Christopher was more likely to encourage continued contact with
the noncustodial parent, an important consideration under Illinois custody
law.218 Thus, while noting that Kimberly was also a loving and competent
parent, both of the formal custody evaluators recommended an award of
custody to Christopher.219
In contrast, neither of the two experts introduced by Kimberly at trial
had met with Kira or Christopher (and indeed in one instance had not met
with Kimberly herself) and neither had been approved as a custody expert
by the court.220 Thus, both of Kimberly’s experts restricted their testimony
primarily to critiquing certain methodological defects in the reports of the
two formal custody evaluators.221 Specifically, both of Kimberly’s experts
questioned the inferences that the Drs. Hynan and Hatcher had drawn from
Kimberly’s psychological testing, contending that those inferences were
culturally biased and lacked context.222 Finally, despite not being qualified
to do so, both of Kimberly’s experts testified that because Kira was biracial,
she would be best served by being placed with Kimberly, the minority
parent.223 As described by the trial court, both experts “seemed to be
testifying for the proposition that solely because [Kimberly] is African

216 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 207, at app. 134a, 136a, 146a, 155a (reproducing
Dr. Hynan’s and Dr. Hatcher’s reports, and reflecting that both expressed concerns about
Kimberly’s impulsivity and self-control in view of the testing profile observed by Dr. Hynan).
217 Id. at app. 145a-146a, 163a.
218 Id. at app. 148a, 163a.
219 Id. at app. 143a, 163a.
220 Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 857-59 (noting that the trial court only found Drs. Thomas and
Alexander qualified to opine on the custody evaluators’ methods); Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 207, at app. 165a, 175a (expert reports of Anita Thomas, Ph.D., and Charles L.
Alexander, Psy.D.) (showing that neither of the experts that testified for Kimberly had met with
Kira and Christopher and that one had not met with Kimberly herself).
221 See Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 858-59 (summarizing Dr. Thomas’s and Dr. Alexander’s trial
testimony and showing that it focused primarily on critiquing methodological defects in Dr.
Hynan’s and Dr. Hatcher’s approaches); see also id. at 875 (McLaren, J., dissenting) (dismissing
Drs. Thomas’s and Alexander’s testimony as merely “inaccurate comments that [the custody
evaluators] should have considered the race and circumstances of the parties when they conducted
their tests”).
222 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 207, at app. 165a, 175a.
223 Id. at app. 68a-69a (trial court opinion).
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American and because Kira is a biracial child, her custody should be awarded
to [Kimberly].”224
The trial court—while claiming to reject this “broad stroke” approach—
would nevertheless itself find race to be dispositive of Kira’s best interest.225
After finding the parties equally deserving of custody under each of the
statutory factors set out in Illinois’s Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act,226 and rejecting each of the bases articulated by the custody evaluators
for awarding custody to Christopher, the court noted that Kimberly, as a
black woman, “will be able . . . to provide Kira with a breadth of cultural
knowledge and experience that [Christopher] will not be able to do.”227
Based on this “special circumstance[],” the court concluded that Kimberly
would be better able “to provide for the emotional needs of [Kira]” and
awarded sole custody to Kimberly.228
On appeal, Christopher—by then proceeding pro se—argued to the Illinois Court of Appeals that this race-based decision was erroneous on both
factual and legal grounds.229 But the court would reject each of Christopher’s claims, finding as to the race issue that both Illinois law and federal
constitutional doctrine permitted the use of race in a custody award.230
Thus, the court concluded that the trial court’s decision, which also mentioned factors other than race (albeit none that it suggested might be
dispositive), did not run afoul of constitutional or common law custody
strictures.231 One justice dissented, contending, inter alia, that the trial
court’s use of race had been constitutionally impermissible.232
The Illinois Supreme Court denied review of the Illinois Court of Appeals
decision on November 29, 2006.233 Thus, on February 27, 2007, Christopher
224
225
226

Id. at app. 68a.
Id. at app. 68a-69a.
For example, although Kira had a sibling in Kimberly’s custody, the court found that the
statutory factor of “interrelationship of the child with her parents, her siblings and any other
persons who may significantly affect her best interests” weighed evenly in favor of both parties
because Kira had a close and loving relationship with the relatives who lived with her father. Id. at
app. 66a.
227 Id. at app. 68a-69a; see also Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 873-76 (McLaren, J., dissenting) (arguing that the trial court’s award of custody was based solely on race, and that the court erred in not
accepting the qualified experts’ recommendations).
228 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 207, at app. 69a.
229 See generally Gambla, 853 N.E.2d 847.
230 Id. at 868-70.
231 See id. (finding that the trial court’s multifactor analysis did not even require substantive
constitutional scrutiny); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 207, at app. 63a-72a
(making clear that the trial court considered the parties to be equally situated vis-à-vis all factors
other than race).
232 See Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 872-78 (McLaren, J., dissenting).
233 Gambla v. Woodson, 861 N.E.2d 654 (Ill. 2006).
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Gambla sought certiorari review from the United States Supreme Court.234
Focusing principally on Palmore v. Sidoti, Gambla’s pro se petition argued
that Palmore precluded precisely the type of dispositive reliance on race that
had occurred in his case.235 If Palmore was to mean anything, Gambla
contended, it must mean at least that “race cannot be the basis for the
decision.”236 Moreover, he asserted, there was a conflict among the lower
courts regarding Palmore’s reach, further justifying a grant of certiorari.237
The odds for Gambla’s petition—while well-written and sophisticated
for a pro se submission—did not, a priori, look good. The Court very rarely
grants pro se petitions of any kind, and the few such petitions that the
Court does grant typically come from the in forma pauperis, or unpaid,
docket, of which Gambla was not a part.238 Nevertheless, two months after
Gambla filed his petition, the Court requested a response from Woodson’s
attorney.239 Such a “call for a response,” while by no means dispositive of a
grant of certiorari, does represent a significant improvement in a litigant’s
odds of receiving such a grant.240 The Court does not grant certiorari
without a response on file, and will only call for a response when at least
one Justice believes a grant might be warranted.241 Therefore, the Court’s
call for a response signals that a case has a better than average chance of
being awarded review.
And indeed, it is not difficult to see why one or more of the Justices
thought that review might be warranted in Gambla’s case. At the time
Gambla submitted his petition, the Court was in the final stages of deciding
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (PICS),
one of the most significant and controversial cases to deal with “benign”
racial classifications during recent decades.242 Involving the use of race to
achieve integrated schools at the elementary and secondary school level,

234
235
236
237
238

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 207.
Id. at 13-15.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16-19.
Kevin H. Smith, Justice for All?: The Supreme Court’s Denial of Pro Se Petitions for Certiorari,
63 ALB. L. REV. 381, 383-84 & n.6 (1999) (reviewing data regarding the Supreme Court’s
infrequent grants of certiorari to pro se petitioners).
239 Docket, No. 06-1193, Gambla v. Woodson, available athttp://www.supremecourt.gov/
Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/06-1193.htm (last updated Nov. 2, 2007).
240 David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 237, 244 (2009) (“[A] petition [for certiorari] is 9 times more likely to be granted
once the Court calls for a response.”).
241 Id. at 242.
242 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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PICS was widely perceived by both supporters and opponents as a significant opportunity for the Court to further limit benign uses of race.243
In fact the Court would—when it issued the PICS opinion in late June
2007—reaffirm the necessity of strictly scrutinizing all uses of race, while
even more closely cabining the circumstances in which individual racial
classifications are allowed.244 And although the majority in PICS did not
speak with a wholly unified voice, with Justice Kennedy chiding his conservative colleagues for their simplistic endorsement of colorblindness in
law, even Kennedy’s own concerns—which centered primarily on the
individual and community harms from treating an individual differently on
the basis of race—seemed equally implicated by the use of race at issue in
Gambla.245 Thus, Gambla—which categorically affirmed the constitutionality
of using race to deprive a nonminority parent of custody, so long as race was
not the exclusive factor—presented an obvious tension with the approach of
the soon-to-be issued decision in PICS.
Nevertheless, Gambla would not be one of the cases for which a call for a
response is a precursor to a grant of full review. On October 1, 2007, after
the Court’s return from its summer recess, the Court would deny Gambla’s
petition for certiorari.246 Gambla’s petition for rehearing—filed shortly
thereafter—would also be denied, bringing his four-year custody battle to
an end.247

243 See, e.g., High Court to Rule on Racial Quotas, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 6, 2006, at 6B
(noting that “[c]ourt watchers believe the acceptance of the case shows the court under new Chief
Justice John Roberts intends to wade in and clear up the confusing legal status of ‘affirmative
action’”); Linda Greenhouse, Court Reviews Race as a Factor in School Plans, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
2006, at A1 (“At its most profound, the debate among the justices was over whether measures
designed to maintain or achieve integration should be subjected to the same harsh scrutiny to
which Brown v. Board of Education subjected the regime of official segregation. In the view of the
conservative majority, the answer is yes.”); Editorial, The High Court, Race and Education, WASH.
TIMES, June 7, 2006, at A20 (citing the retirement of Justice O’Connor—who provided the swing
vote in Grutter v. Bollinger—as an opportunity for the court to change “the race-based admissions
policies that it enshrined in 2003”); David G. Savage, Barring Choice Based on Race Threatens Civil
Rights, Some Say, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 5, 2006, at A3 (noting that “[t]he Supreme
Court justices, hearing arguments on school integration, signaled Monday that they are likely to
bar the use of race when assigning students to public schools,” and opining that this “would be a
major victory for those who have called for ‘color-blind’ decision-making by public officials”).
244 See PICS, 551 U.S. at 720-25, 733-35; see also id. at 725-33, 735-48 (plurality opinion); id. at
748-82 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing even more strongly for tightly circumscribing the use of
race).
245 See PICS, 551 U.S. at 795-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (articulating concerns that racial
classifications are “divisive” and can lead to a “corrosive discourse”).
246 Gambla v. Woodson, 552 U.S. 810 (2007).
247 Petition for Rehearing, Gambla, 552 U.S. 810 (No. 06-1193), pet. denied, 552 U.S. 1056
(2007).
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V. POSTSCRIPT: THE 2012 TERM
On January 4, 2013—thirty-five years after Bakke and Drummond—the
Court would once again face the question it had faced in Drummond:
whether to take up an adoption case in the same term as a major affirmative
action decision.248 Just as thirty-five years ago, Bakke—by then fully briefed
and argued—provided the backdrop to the Court’s consideration of whether
to grant review in Drummond, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin—the
Court’s first major affirmative action case in nearly a decade—was fully
argued and awaiting decision when the Court met to decide whether to
grant review for this new adoption case.249
The facts of the new adoption case also bore striking similarities to the
Drummonds’ own circumstances in 1978. Like Drummond, the petitioners in
the pending case had raised a child essentially from birth, only to see the
child removed from their home as a toddler.250 And, like Drummond, the
facts left little doubt that the child’s heritage played a key role in the
removal (although here at issue was a federal law preferencing Indian
parents for Indian children, not a state race-matching policy).251 In both
cases, the prospective adoptive parents were undisputedly loving and
competent parents, with deep attachments to the child removed from their
home.252
But this new case—Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl—was also fundamentally
distinct from Drummond in critical respects.253 Unlike in Drummond, the
248 See Docket, No. 12-399, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-399.htm (last updated July 5, 2013);
see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012);
Docket, No. 11-345, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-345.htm (last updated Aug. 16, 2013).
249 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (showing that Bakke was
argued October 12, 1977, and decided June 28, 1978); see also Docket Sheet, No. 77-1381, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs. (June 19, 1978) (on file with the Library
of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) (showing that the Drummond petition for certiorari was
filed in March 1978, and the vote to deny certiorari was held in mid-June 1978); cf. Memorandum
from K.E. on No. 77-1381, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., to the
Cert Pool 13 (June 1, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers)
(arguing against a hold on Drummond despite the fact that Bakke was pending, because the cases
“arise in such different factual context[s]”).
250 Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 547 F.2d 835, 837 (5th
Cir. 1977); Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 554-55 (S.C. 2012).
251 Compare Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200,
1204-06 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), with Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555-56.
252 See Drummond, 547 F.2d at 841-46; Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 567.
253 I focus here on the legal differences between Adoptive Couple and Drummond, but there
were important factual differences as well. Most important, in Adoptive Couple, Baby Girl’s
biological father desired to raise her and was the party contesting the adoption. It was only
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predominant issues presented for review in Adoptive Couple were statutory,
not constitutional, arising under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA).254 And, to the extent that constitutional concerns might be
implicated (as the Petitioners and the guardian ad litem suggested), it was
far from clear that strict scrutiny—as opposed to rational basis review—
would apply.255 Because the ICWA applied by virtue of Baby Girl’s “Indian”
status—a status the Court has traditionally treated as political, rather than
racial—even plenary consideration of Adoptive Couple would not (unlike the
cases that had come before) require the Court to directly take up the
conflict with its affirmative action precedents that it had long sought to
avoid.256
And indeed, the outcome for the prospective adoptive parents in Adoptive
Couple (the Capobiancos) would ultimately differ dramatically from that
faced by the Drummonds. In January 2013, the Court would—unlike in
Drummond—grant certiorari review in Adoptive Couple.257 Ultimately, the
Court would interpret the ICWA to hold that state law, not the ICWA’s
Indian-specific provisions, must control.258 As such, the Court would hold
that no bar existed under federal law to Baby Girl’s adoption by the
Capobiancos, a holding that would later result in the return of Baby Girl to
the Capobianco’s custody for adoption.259

because of the specifics of South Carolina state law (which did not require the consent of a
biological father to adoption where the father was not involved during the pregnancy or immediately post-birth) that the ICWA issues became the focus of the proceedings.
254 Compare Federal Drummond Petition, supra note 43, at 4-5, 25-27 (arguing for strict scrutiny to review the use of race discrimination in adoption and analogizing to then-pending Bakke),
with Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl at *ii, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013)
(No. 12-399) [hereinafter Adoptive Couple Petition] (presenting only statutory questions for
review). But cf. Adoptive Couple Petition, supra, at 26 (suggesting that equal protection principles
should inform the statutory analysis); Response of Guardian Ad Litem at *10-12, Adoptive Couple,
133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399) (raising the equal protection issue prominently).
255 See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
256 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974) (finding that the hiring preferences
given to Indians within the Bureau of Indian Affairs were distinct from invidious race discrimination because they were not racial preferences, but rather “employment criteri[a] reasonably
designed to further the cause of Indian self-government”); cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 304 n.42 (1978) (Powell, J.) (rejecting the view that Mancari supported the argument
that something less than strict scrutiny should be applied on the grounds that the classification at
issue in Mancari “was not racial at all”).
257 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (granting certiorari review).
258 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
259 Id.; see also Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 404 S.C. 490, 492-493 (2013) (holding, on remand,
that Baby Girl must be removed from her biological father’s home and returned to her prospective
adoptive parents for the finalization of the adoption). See generally Father Is Ending Battle for Custody,
TULSA WORLD (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/father-is-ending-battle-for-custody/
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Moreover, the Court would, for the first time in Adoptive Couple seem to
express a less than fully approving view of certain forms of heritage-based
adoption decisionmaking. Mirroring long-time legal and social norms
essentializing those of only partial Native American heritage as non-Indian,
the Court would repeatedly signal its discomfort with applying the ICWA’s
Indian preferences to someone of Baby Girl’s “remote” Native American
ancestry.260 Characterizing the application of the ICWA’s provisions in such
a context as a “great disadvantage,” the Court would ultimately conclude
that the statute’s application in Adoptive Couple “would raise equal protection concerns.”261 Thus, at least with regard to those like Baby Girl—
perceived by the Court as not being truly of the heritage ascribed to her
under the law—Adoptive Couple seemed to signal, for the first time, the
Court’s perception of certain race-matching prescriptions as less than fully
benign.262
But ultimately, despite these signs of the Court’s discomfort with the
ICWA’s potential reach, Adoptive Couple would do little to disrupt the
existing, constitutionally permissive, race/family law regime.263 Thus, the
article_125eb3a1-77db-57d5-9f4a-e71612be7502.html (detailing the timeline of the Adoptive Couple
legal dispute).
260 See, e.g., Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556, 2559, 2565 (repeatedly noting the precise
quantum of Baby Girl’s blood heritage, and characterizing it as “remote”). This anxiety over an
insufficient biological nexus to Indian status—while irrelevant as a matter of equal protection
doctrine—tracks the historical tendency to essentialize those with relatively little Native American
status as non-Native American, a tendency that has been precisely reversed in the context of
African Americans. See, e.g., Kevin Noble Maillard, The Pocahontas Exception: The Exemption of
American Indian Ancestry From Racial Purity Law, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 351, 372 (2007); cf.
Gregory Ablavsky, Comment, Making Indians “White”: The Judicial Abolition of Native Slavery in
Revolutionary Virginia and its Racial Legacy, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1457, 1515-19 (2011) (describing the
historical legal categorization of Indians as “white” and government efforts to convert Indian
cultural practices).
261 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
262 It is not clear that this specific discomfort is a signal of a broader disapproval on the
Court of the use of race or heritage in adoption. To the extent that the key concern in Adoptive
Couple was Baby Girl’s insufficient Native American heritage (as the majority opinion’s repeated
allusions to her blood quantum suggest), the crux of the Court’s concern appears to have been that
she was inaccurately race-matched, not the fact of the utilization of racial or ethnic heritage in the
adoption process. Cf. Reisman v. Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 843 F. Supp. 356, 363-66 (W.D.
Tenn. 1993) (finding a violation of equal protection where an agency race-matched biracial
children with black parents, but ordering instead that “bi-racial children shall be placed in foster
homes and in adoptive homes with bi-racial families”—i.e., that they should be even more
specifically race matched).
263 From a constitutional perspective, the status quo vis-à-vis remaining race-based family
law practices remains largely unchanged today. Thus, while such cases are less frequent today (due
in part to the changes brought about by MEPA), multiple jurisdictions continue to have nonoverruled decisions affirming the constitutionality of using race in adoption, foster care, or
interracial custody disputes when race is not the sole factor. See, e.g., J.H.H. v. O’Hara, 878 F.2d
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majority opinion in Adoptive Couple would—despite hinting obliquely at
potential constitutional concerns—ultimately leave all of the ICWA’s core
provisions intact.264 Indeed, despite the sharp disagreements that Adoptive
Couple generated among the Justices, no Justice—in the majority or the
dissent—would suggest that the ICWA’s core heritage-based provision
(mandating the preferential placement of Indian children with other
Indians) must be struck down.265
Nor would any member of the Court suggest that strict scrutiny—and
the meaningful constitutional examination that it entails—must be applied
240, 241-45 (8th Cir. 1989) (awarding qualified immunity in a case where the agency had a policy
stating that “[m]inority children shall be placed with families of similar racial and ethnic
characteristics”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990); Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family &
Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1204-06 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978);
Tallman v. Tabor, 859 F. Supp. 1078, 1085-88 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Child v. Stangler, No. 92-0850,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19954, at *7-9 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 1992) (noting in dicta that relying on
race as a factor is not improper in an adoption proceeding); In re F.W., 870 A.2d 82, 86-87 (D.C.
2005) (affirming that race is a proper consideration in adoption determinations); In re Petition of
D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316, 1319-27 (D.C. 1985); Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t. of Family &
Children’s Servs., 228 S.E.2d 839, 844 (Ga. 1976) (finding that “the Drummonds ha[d] no rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment” and thus no standing to contest denial of adoption based on
race), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 905 (1977); Gambla, 853 N.E.2d 847, 868-70 (Ill. App. Div. 2006), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 810 (2007); Gloria G. v. State Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 833 P.2d 979, 984-86
(Kan. 1992); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d 1036, 1042-49 (Md. 1994); In re
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 453 N.E.2d 1236, 1237, 1239 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983), aff ’d on other grounds, 461
N.E.2d 186 (Mass. 1984); In re Carpenter, No. 21634, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 2140, at *9-11
(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1999); Carlson v. County of Hennepin, 428 N.W.2d 453, 455, 458 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988) (granting qualified immunity to the adoption agency in a case where the prospective parents were informed that “it would be against county policy to allow a white couple to adopt
a black child”), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1023 (1989); Brown v. Brown, 621 N.W.2d 70, 82-83 (Neb.
2000); In re Haven, No. C-780343, 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 9744, at *6-16 (Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1979);
cf. In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 784-89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (invalidating, in different
appellate district than Haven, an agency’s exclusive use of race to disqualify an adoptive family).
Four other states have never reached the constitutional issue but have permitted uses of race
in adoption, foster care, or interracial custody disputes as a matter of state law. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Mikelson, 299 N.W.2d 670 (Iowa 1980); Savage v. Cota, 885 N.Y.S.2d 798 (App. Div.
2009); Davis v. Davis, 658 N.Y.S.2d 548 (App. Div. 1997); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1981)
(ambiguous whether based on constitutional analysis or state law); In re Adoption of A.S.H., 674
A.2d 698 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (same); Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755 (Wash. 1950); Tucker v. Tucker,
542 P.2d 789 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (affirming that race can be a factor in custody disputes
between interracial parents, albeit not the sole factor).
264 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565 (suggesting that constitutional concerns would be
raised by a different result). But cf. id. at 2564 (leaving intact ICWA’s statutory preference
framework). The opinion leaves intact, inter alia, a statutory framework which prefers members of
the child’s tribe and “other Indian families” above other competing adoptive families, finding it to
be inapplicable based purely on the technical grounds that no competing adoption petitions had
been filed. Id. at 2564-65.
265 See supra note 264; see also Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2572 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(discussing § 1915’s placement preferences).
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as the applicable constitutional standard of review. Indeed, the majority—
despite its brief allusion to equal protection—would itself apply no meaningful constitutional scrutiny to the ICWA, nor otherwise signal that a
strict scrutiny standard might be appropriate.266 And five of the Justices in
Adoptive Couple—including race conservatives such as Justices Thomas and
Scalia—would entirely eschew an equal protection-based rationale, electing
instead to rely on purely statutory or unrelated constitutional rationales.267
Thus, despite the Court’s virtually simultaneous reaffirmance of its “colorblind” approach to affirmative action doctrine in Fisher, it would not, in
Adoptive Couple, seek to extend that doctrine to the family law domain.268
Therefore, Adoptive Couple—far from staging a revolutionary incursion
into the lower courts’ permissive approach to the use of race in family law—
would instead continue the Court’s long-standing hands-off approach. Three
and a half decades after Drummond and Bakke, the Court would again elect
to leave the affirmative action–family law divide essentially undisturbed.269
Although much had arguably changed since Drummond—with the Court’s
colorblindness “revolution” unfolding across a series of landmark cases—the
Court’s constitutional approach to family law would change little; continuing as ever it had before.

266 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565 (alluding briefly to potential “equal protection
concerns” but without applying strict scrutiny to the ICWA’s provisions or otherwise suggesting
that strict scrutiny would be the appropriate standard of review).
267 Id. at 2570 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2584-85 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (joined
in relevant part by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Scalia). The dissenters addressed the equal
protection issue, but concluded that no equal protection concern existed, given that classifications
based on Indian tribal membership have traditionally been treated as non-racial. See id. at 2584-85
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
268 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) (holding that any racial
classification, including those that “may seem benign,” must be subject to strict scrutiny). I do not
mean to suggest here that it was erroneous for the dissenters in Adoptive Couple to treat the ICWA
context as distinctive due to the Court’s historical treatment of Indian status as a political, rather
than racial, status. Rather, the point here is that to the extent the Court viewed the classifications
at issue in Adoptive Couple as racial, rather than political, it entirely declined to apply the
framework that it has otherwise deemed applicable in the affirmative action context. For further
elaboration of this point, see infra note 276.
269 There are many possible factors that complicate any attempt to understand Adoptive
Couple simplistically, including the different cultural and legal salience that has traditionally
attached to Indian status. Cf. supra note 260. Thus, although it is undoubtedly accurate that the
Court did not elect to use the case as a basis for eliminating (or even meaningfully narrowing) the
affirmative action–family law divide, it is certainly plausible that a much more complicated set of
considerations may have been at work in Adoptive Couple than in some of the other cases in which
the Court has declined to intervene entirely. Unfortunately, access to the Justices’ papers (which
might allow a fuller understanding of the internal dynamics in Adoptive Couple) will likely not be
available for a very long time.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS
There are two very different stories to be told of the history of the
Court’s constitutional race law jurisprudence. The first—told by the Court
itself in its affirmative action opinions—is one in which context has mattered
little.270 Under this account, what has mattered to the Court is not any
contextual factor—such as whether a particular racial classification may be
categorized as putatively benign—but instead simply the use of race itself.
Government uses of race are simply too categorically divisive, too inherently
problematic, to be exempted from strict scrutiny review on any grounds.
Instead, equal protection has demanded (and continues to demand) that the
Court strive toward colorblindness and cabin uses of race to the narrowest
of circumstances; only where they may be characterized as “narrowly
tailored” to meet a “compelling state interest.” This account, then, is one in
which consistency—across all of race law’s many domains—is treated as
doctrinally demanded of the Court and held out as empirically true.
But a very different story is told by the history of the Court’s involvement in contemporary race-based family law practices.271 Here, many of the
same Justices who have rejected contextual variability in the affirmative
action context have taken the opposite approach: they have embraced
variable standards and rejected consistency as the rubric that the constitution demands. Thus, many of the same Justices who have formed the Court’s
majority on affirmative action—far from demanding the uniform application
of strict scrutiny in the family law context—have consistently avoided the
application of strict scrutiny to contemporary race-based family law practices. And these actions, it seems, have been based precisely on the types of
normatively based considerations that the Court’s race conservatives have,
in the affirmative action context, decried.
Some might resist this account, so far from the Court’s own. But it is
difficult to read the historical record otherwise. Thus, Palmore v. Sidoti—
long conceptualized by scholars in terms consistent with the Court’s own
account—is cast in a far different light by the archival records available
today. Despite its contemporary canonical status, Palmore was not a case the
Court’s race conservatives wanted to take up.272 And, when the Court’s
liberal wing (joined by Justice Stevens) nevertheless voted to do so, the
Court’s race conservatives successfully advocated to limit its reach, based
precisely on the perception that the remaining uses of race in family law
270
271
272

For further discussion and sources, see generally supra Introduction and Part III.
For further discussion and sources, see generally supra Sections I–V.
See supra notes 100-01 and supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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were fundamentally “different” and benign.273 Thus, the lower courts’
response to Palmore—as of marginal significance outside of its specific
context—appears to be exactly that intended by the Court’s race conservatives and race moderates, rather than an aberrational or willful misreading.274
Nor did the Court embrace the much more recent opportunity afforded
to it to bring its affirmative action and family law jurisprudence into
alignment.275 Although the race discrimination issue was strongly argued by
both the petitioners and guardian ad litem in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
the Court itself restricted its equal protection analysis to a single ambiguous
sentence.276 Moreover, two of the Court’s leading race conservatives—
Justices Scalia and Thomas—declined to endorse even this soft statement,
eschewing any form of equal protection-based rationale.277 Thus, despite the
strength of the rhetoric that the Court’s race conservatives have deployed in
arguing for the inherent invidiousness of any race-based practices, their
actions in the family law context reflect a far different approach.
And although the Court’s reticence in Adoptive Couple might be explained
by its particular context (involving primarily statutory issues and arising in
the Indian law context), context cannot similarly explain the entirety of the
Court’s decades-long silence on the lower courts’ loose and permissive
approach to race in the family. Since the mid-1970s, litigants have repeatedly—
in cases squarely presenting the issue—urged the Court to take up and
address its family law–affirmative action divide. In every single one of those
cases, the court below declined to apply strict scrutiny review. And in every
273
274

See supra notes 133-42 and supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
Compare supra note 273, with supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text. See generally supra
Sections II-III.
275 See generally supra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
276 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013); see also Brief for Petitioners at
44-47, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399); Brief for Guardian ad Litem at 53-55, Adoptive
Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399). Even in this single sentence, the Court did not explicitly state
that it viewed the ICWA as entailing a race-based classification, although it implied as much.
Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565. I do not mean to suggest here that the Court should have
viewed the ICWA’s provisions as involving a racial, rather than political, designation for equal
protection purposes. Cf. id. at 2584-85 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (contending that the ICWA’s
classifications should be considered nonracial under the Court’s precedents). I simply observe
that—to the extent the majority viewed the issue as a racial one—they failed to apply the
constitutional framework that the Court reaffirmed as a categorical imperative just the previous
day. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417-19 (2013) (reiterating that “[a]ny
racial classification must meet strict scrutiny” and that racial classifications are inherently “odious”
and “inherently suspect” (citations omitted)).
277 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2570 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2585 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting); id. at 257-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that he joined Justice Sotomayor’s dissent
“except as to one detail” of her statutory reasoning unrelated to the equal protection analysis).
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one of those cases, the litigant challenging the use of race lost below. Yet, in
every case for which we have internal records, including Palmore, each of the
Court’s race conservatives uniformly voted against certiorari review.278 In
contrast, the vast majority of the Court’s race liberals and race moderates
have cast votes in favor of certiorari review.279
Nor is it plausible to ascribe this uniform pattern simply to the vagaries
of certiorari review. To be sure, the Court turns down many cases for
reasons that are wholly unrelated to their merits.280 But the cases that have
reached the Court have included a vast array of compelling circumstances:
cases in which the court below found race to be the sole cause, cases in
which there was a categorical policy of placing minority children with
minority families, cases in which no Justice disputed that race was dispositive.281 Under these circumstances, it is difficult—if not impossible—to

278 Docket Sheet, No. 92-616, Sharp v. Hennepin County (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers); Docket Sheet, No. 90-123, Wilson v. Darrow (on file with the
Blackmun Digital Archive); Docket Sheet, No. 89-906, J.H.H. v. O’Hara (on file with the Library
of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers); Docket Sheet, No. 88-6265, Carlson v. County of
Hennepin (on file with the Blackmun Digital Archive); Docket Sheet, No. 82-1734, Palmore v.
Sidoti (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Papers); Docket Sheet #2, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Washington and Lee
University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers); Docket Sheet, No. 82-1734, Palmore v.
Sidoti (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers); Docket Sheet, No.
82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers);
Docket Sheet, No. 76-984, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dept. of Family & Children’s Servs. (on
file with the Library of Congress, Byron R. White Papers); Docket Sheet, No. 77-1381, Drummond
v. Fulton County Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs. (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry
A. Blackmun Papers); see also Docket Sheet, A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Washington
and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers) (Palmore stay proceedings);
Memorandum of Thurgood Marshall on No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to the Conference (Mar. 3,
1983) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers)
(Palmore stay proceedings).
279 See supra note 278.
280 Compare Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (explaining that because of the range
of considerations that can lead to a denial of certiorari review, such denials do not have the same
effect as a decision on the merits), with McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3094 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (ascribing substantive legal meaning to the Court’s pattern of certiorari
denials despite recognizing their lack of precedential weight).
281 See, e.g., J.H.H. v. O’Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 243-45 (8th Cir. 1989) (dismissing a lawsuit
challenging a race-based foster care decision made pursuant to a policy requiring placement of
minority children with families of “similar racial and ethnic characteristics”), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
851 (1990); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d 1036, 1048-49 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1994) (acknowledging that race was the sole consideration in an agency’s foster care/adoption
determination, but nevertheless upholding the placement decision), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 809
(1995); see also supra note 130 (documenting that all Justices appear to have agreed in Palmore that
race was the dispositive or at least predominant factor in the lower court’s decision).
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conclude that the Court has simply been unable to find an appropriate
vehicle for review.282
Thus, it appears that the Court’s absence from contemporary debates
over the use of race in family law has been far from the product of mere
oversight. Family law has been conceived of as simply too “different”—the
use of race there too “natural” and benign—to warrant the type of intervention that has historically been demanded in the affirmative action context.
Instead, the Court has self-consciously—but sub silentio—endorsed the
lower courts’ loose and permissive approach to race in family law, an
approach that has predictably allowed all but the most extreme contemporary instantiations of race-based family law decisionmaking to endure.
This approach to family law stands in stark contrast to the doctrinal justifications that the Court has offered in support of its affirmative action
regime.283 Thus, the Court’s approach to affirmative action—demanding
uniform strict scrutiny, with predictably harsh results—has been justified
precisely by reference to the impermissibility of a contextually or normatively
282 Another alternative explanation—that the Court has avoided such cases because they
involve family law, rather than race-based family law per se—is neither persuasive nor relevant,
even if true. To be sure, the Court has long exceptionalized family law as a bastion of state control
in which the federal courts have little business intervening. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism
and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1297-1310 (1998). But with the exception of
certain narrow doctrinal contexts, all inapplicable here (such as the domestic relations to diversity
jurisdiction), the Court has, in fact, felt free to intervene regularly in family law disputes. See, e.g.,
David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 529 (2008) (observing
that the Court’s decisions have “fundamentally redefined” American family law, refocusing its
central discourse on rights in a way unimaginable under the old regime (quoting Michael
Grossberg, How to Give the Present a Past? Family Law in the United States, 1950–2000, in CROSS
CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 3 (Sanford
Katz et al. eds., 2000))); see also Hasday, supra (challenging, persuasively, the Court’s rhetorical
characterization of family law as a bastion of state control, outside the Court’s and the federal
government’s bailiwick); HASDAY, supra note 16, at 28-68 (same).
Moreover, even if the Court’s reluctance to scrutinize continued uses of race in family law has
derived in part from a generalized reluctance to scrutinize family law issues, such a contextually
based resistance to applying strict scrutiny is nevertheless clearly inconsistent with the Court’s
articulated categorical approach. See supra notes 175-83 (chronicling the Court’s justifications for its
doctrinal approach to affirmative action, based precisely on rhetorical and normative claims that
context does not and cannot matter in determining the level of scrutiny applied to government
uses of race). The Court has sanctioned a regime in which all uses of race, regardless of context,
must be subjected to the most rigid form of review because of their inherent harms. It is just as
inconsistent for the Court to decline to compel the application of strict scrutiny to an area because
it is one in which it wishes to reduce its institutional profile as it is for the Court to do so because
of any of the other contextually based considerations that might cause the Court to desire to
permit greater flexibility in race-based state decisionmaking. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 564-68 (1995) (articulating federalism-based concerns about federal intervention in both
education (the primary locus of affirmative action decisions) and family law).
283 For further discussion and sources, see generally supra Introduction and Part III.
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variable approach. It is impossible to take context into account, we are told,
precisely because the use of race by government is—in every context—so
inherently dangerous and malign. Thus the Court’s aggressive intervention
is not only permissible, but essential, lest the perils of racial decisionmaking infuse our constitutional polity with their inevitable divisiveness
and stigmatic harms. In short, the formal doctrinal position articulated by
the Court in its affirmative action precedents has presumed harm to flow
from all government uses of race, leaving no room for the type of contextual
variability it has in fact allowed.284
This divergence between the Court’s formal race law doctrine and its
actual approach creates profound process, legitimacy, and substantive
concerns. Because the Court has explicitly articulated a particular doctrinal
rule—that no deviations are permitted from strict scrutiny’s inexorable
command—while sub silentio following a different approach, it has deprived
litigants and the public of the ability to fully participate in one of the most
important debates in contemporary American constitutionalism (i.e., which
contemporary uses of race should be permitted to endure).285 Moreover, the
Court’s current approach—unguided by fixed legal standards, and conducted
out of sight of any public scrutiny—of necessity puts the Justices in the
position of picking and choosing which uses of race to favor based on no
more than their own normative intuitions. Such a regime cannot, in the
284 Shorn of this absolutist justification, it is difficult to see what props up the contemporary
affirmative action regime. That is, if the Court does, in fact, deploy a contextually variable
approach to deciding whether to apply strict scrutiny, it is not at all clear why affirmative action,
but not, for example, family law or race-based suspect selection, should fall on the strict scrutiny
side of the divide. Indeed, precisely because the Court has relied so extensively on the assumption
that strict scrutiny is categorical, it has done little work to truly substantiate affirmative action’s
purported harms.
285 To be sure, litigants have been able to participate at the margins of this debate. But in a
regime where the Court has formally denied that context matters to whether or not strict scrutiny
applies, litigants are largely excluded from the Court’s decisions as to which context-based factors
will, in fact, be deployed. This dynamic is rendered even more problematic by the fact that the
strict scrutiny framework itself, as the Court has construed it, allows de minimis real evaluation of
a racial practice’s harms or benefits and thus does not offer an alternative mechanism for this type
of evidence or argumentation to be introduced. For example, strict scrutiny does not encompass
any real world evaluation of the harms or lack of harms of a particular racial practice, and instead
presumes such harms. And while benefits of a practice may be considered as part of the “compelling state interest” analysis, the Court has so significantly narrowed what may be considered a
compelling interest that most of the factors that one might want to consider in assessing whether a
particular racial classification is normatively justified are legally irrelevant. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996) (“[A]n effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination is not a
compelling state interest.”); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1985) (finding that the
desire to provide role models is not a compelling state interest); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) (characterizing Bakke as having held that “[r]edressing past
discrimination could not serve as a compelling interest” in the university context).
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long term, be sustained without fundamental damage to the Court’s legitimacy as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional race law doctrine.286
As importantly, such a regime seems likely to inexorably lead to distortions in the further development of constitutional race law jurisprudence.
Explicitly disclaiming the salience of contextual and normative factors while
in fact attending to them sub rosa predictably leads to doctrinal confusion
and inconsistency. Indeed, arguably a number of the most incoherent and
logically tortured features of both the Supreme Court’s and the lower
courts’ constitutional race law jurisprudence have derived from the attempt
to fit preferred racial practices (including, but not limited to, family law)
within the Court’s contextually unvarying race law framework.287 Thus, the
divergence between doctrine and practice seems likely to lead only to the
further fragmentation and intellectual disintegration of race law doctrine,
stripping it of even the limited veneer of fairness that it derives from its
putative mandate of consistency today.
Perhaps, then, prior family law litigants have been right: what is needed
is for the Court to take up and address contemporary uses of race in family
law and to bring them under the strict scrutiny rubric. Indeed, if family law
stood alone, such an approach might—despite the long historical record—
seem the most plausible approach. There can be no doubt that the Court
has, if anything, turned further toward constitutional colorblindness in
recent years, nor that many of its Justices have a deeply felt normative
commitment to eradicating at least certain uses of race from contemporary
public life. And Adoptive Couple signals that, although the Court has so far
been unwilling to extend its doctrine, there may indeed be instances of racebased family law decisionmaking that at least some of its Justices perceive as

286 Whatever the merits or drawbacks of the Court’s claimed approach to race in the law, it
has the veneer of adherence to the rule of law, of an evenhanded and neutral decisionmaking
principle. Absent such a veneer, the Court’s actions begin to look troublingly like race politics. For
all the reasons that the Court’s race moderates have emphasized, such appearances—whatever the
reality—matter. See generally Siegel, Antibalkanization, supra note 12. Indeed, few would dispute
that it is deeply divisive for the Court to be perceived as a naked power player in the continuing
debates over the proper role of race in American society. Cf. Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection,
supra note 5, at 1120 (making a similar point in the context of discussing the problems with treating
race-based suspect selection as constitutionally exceptional).
287 See supra Parts I–V; see also Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection, supra note 5, at 1108-25
(discussing race-based suspect selection); Siegel, Antibalkanization, supra note 12, at 1361 (same); cf.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (holding that in the disfavored context of affirmative
action, only the use of race as a factor is required to trigger strict scrutiny); Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (finding that in the favored context of redistricting, the plaintiff must show
that race was the “predominant factor” to trigger strict scrutiny).
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malign.288 Thus, it is plausible that, were the Court faced with the need to
align its family law and affirmative action doctrines, affirmative action’s
putatively categorical approach would endure.
But family law does not stand alone in its current exemption from the
Court’s putatively categorical colorblindness revolution. As scholars such as
Rick Banks and Reva Siegel have observed, family law is only one of a
number of areas—including race-based suspect selection, nonclassifying
(but race-intentional) efforts to promote integration, and other nonindividualized efforts to promote substantive equality—in which the lower
courts have consistently declined to apply strict scrutiny review, and in
which the Supreme Court has consistently declined to intervene. Indeed,
despite affirmative action law’s ostensibly categorical command, there are
relatively few areas to which the Court has formally extended its reach.289
Thus, there remain today many areas in which governments (state, local,
and federal) continue to make open and pervasive use of race, as to which
the Court has traditionally declined to apply strict scrutiny review.
There are strong reasons to believe that the Court is—at least at present—
unprepared to dramatically reshape this very partial regime. Thus, although
there have been hints across a number of domains that the Court has begun
to problematize racial practices that have long remained effectively unscrutinized, it has so far shown itself far from willing to fully embrace the implications of a truly colorblind race law regime.290 Indeed, several of the
288 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013) (characterizing the application of the ICWA as a disadvantage, rather than a benefit, at least where the child at issue has only
“remote” Native American heritage).
289 See supra note 5. Even in the few contexts where the Court has ostensibly extended its
affirmative action precedents, it has often in fact applied different gatekeeping standards and
declined to apply strict scrutiny across the board to all uses of race. Compare Miller, 515 U.S. at 917,
920 (holding that strict scrutiny applies to race-based redistricting, but demanding a showing that
race was the “predominant factor” in order to trigger review), with Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (stating
that race need only be a factor in order to trigger strict scrutiny review). See also Ian HaneyLópez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1868-71 (2012) (discussing the extension of
the colorblindness doctrine to redistricting, and characterizing the Court’s contortions to avoid
broadly invalidating uses of race in the redistricting context as “comedic”).
290 Most notably, the longstanding characterization of government actions that are race targeted but do not individually classify based on race as “race-neutral” has been increasingly
problematized by the Court. (This includes, for example, programs like Texas’s Ten Percent Plan,
race-based school districting to promote integration, and the myriad of other government
programs that seek to promote substantive equality goals without formally racially classifying.)
See, e.g., Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Only an ostrich could regard . . . supposedly neutral alternatives [to affirmative action, such as Texas’s Ten Percent Plan] as
race unconscious”); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701,
745 (2007) (plurality opinion) (declining to express any opinion “even in dicta” on the constitutional validity of race-intentional government actions); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340 (questioning
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Justices key to any such doctrinal revolution—including Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, and Scalia—have, in ways explicit and implicit, signaled strongly
their unwillingness to make such a move.291
And yet such nonstrict scrutiny uses of race are becoming increasingly
difficult for the Court to simply avoid. As colorblindness’s inexorable
command has seeped its way deep into legal doctrine and the public consciousness, conservative litigation groups—and the lower courts—have
increasingly questioned exemptions that historically have been taken as
obvious and benign.292 As they do so, the Court will find itself increasingly
whether ten percent plans like Texas’s can properly be characterized as “race-neutral”); see also
Siegel, Antibalkanization, supra note 12, at 1283 (making a similar observation regarding the
increasing problematization of these practices); cf. Lewis v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 662 F.3d
343, 349 (5th Cir. 2011) (questioning, in the aftermath of PICS, whether “benign” race-intentional
school redistricting can be exempted from strict scrutiny). But see infra note 291 (discussing the
open resistance of several key race conservatives to truly reading the Court’s affirmative action
precedents as globally requiring strict scrutiny).
291 See, e.g., PICS, 551 U.S. at 787-89, 796-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing the normative view that school districts should be able to make use of devices that are intended to
increase racial integration but which do not individually classify based on race (such as strategic
school site selection, redrawing of attendance zones, etc.), and expressing the view that such
approaches should not trigger strict scrutiny); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 541 (2005)
(Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J. dissenting) (rejecting, strenuously, the argument that the Court’s
affirmative action precedents in fact demand the application of strict scrutiny to all uses of race
and contending instead that those precedents address only the narrow issue of whether “classifications favoring rather than disfavoring blacks are exempt” from strict scrutiny); Siegel, Antibalkanization, supra note 12, at 1308 (noting the significance of Justice Kennedy’s position in PICS); see also
supra note 277 and accompanying text (noting that in Adoptive Couple, Justices Scalia and Thomas
declined to join even the majority’s very soft intimation that the use of racial heritage in adoption
might trigger equal protection concerns).
292 For example, the conservative litigation group Pacific Legal Foundation has increasingly
called upon the Court to apply strict scrutiny to uses of race that have intended racially ameliorative effects but do not classify racially, a category of race-based practices that the lower courts have
traditionally exempted from strict scrutiny review. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal
Foundation & Center for Equal Opportunity in Support of Neither Party, Township of Mount
Holly, NJ v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (No. 11-1507); Brief
for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Student Doe 1 v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 S. Ct. 2773 (2012) (No. 11-35); Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation & Center
for Equal Opportunity as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, City of New Haven v. Briscoe, 132
S. Ct. 2741 (2012) (No. 11-1024); Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (No. 10-1032); Brief of Pacific
Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S.
205 (2010) (No. 08-974); Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Oakley v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, 557 U.S. 930 (2009) (No. 08-744); Brief for
Pacific Legal Foundation et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Bartlett v. Strickland,
556 U.S. 1 (2009) (No. 07-689).
The lower courts have also in recent years begun to display increased receptiveness to these
types of arguments. See, e.g., Lewis v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 662 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 2011);
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 242 n.156 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds 133 S.
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faced with a regime in which simply ignoring continued uses of race—and
allowing the lower courts to continue to refuse strict scrutiny review—will
prove an untenable approach. Thus, we may well be poised at a juncture
where the way is uniquely open—and the stakes uniquely high—for a
reassessment of the extent to which context should—and does—matter to
our constitutional race law jurisprudence.
Such a development—whatever its substantive outcomes—would be an
improvement. In an area as divisive and charged as race, it can only breed
cynicism and disrespect for the Court to hold out as the fundamental
justification for its actions normative and empirical claims that are not true.
Nor can such an approach hope to achieve real progress in solving the
genuine problems posed by race in our society. In short, without an honest
starting point, we cannot hope to have meaningful conversations about the
contemporary constitutional significance of race.
CONCLUSION
As Jed Rubenfeld has observed, it is sometimes only by looking across
the sweep of the law that we can understand the Court’s true doctrinal and
normative commitments.293 The contemporary history of race in family law
bears this out and demonstrates that even within the relatively narrow span
of equal protection doctrine, a nonholistic view can obscure key insights.
Thus, it is only by looking across the spread of equal protection doctrine—
and particularly at the Court’s complex role in the history of contemporary
race family doctrine—that the very partial nature of the Court’s commitment to its colorblindness regime emerges.
This partiality has, or should have, fundamental implications for the
Court’s race law doctrine. If certain favored uses of race in the law do in fact
exist, such uses should be decided not in accordance with the Justices’
intuitive and personal views, but instead based on some systematic and
transparent means of adjudication. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more
Ct. 2411 (2013); Antonelli v. New Jersey, 419 F.3d 267, 273-74 (3d Cir. 2005); cf. Balkin & Siegel,
Principles, supra note 5, at 930-33, 937-43 (describing the process through which consensus can shift
as to the applicability of a legal principle, and looking at the example of the collection of racial
data and whether it fits within the antidiscrimination principle).
293 Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1144 (2002) (arguing that “[a] line of cases can seem perfectly intelligible when evaluated in its own doctrinal
compartment, yet its intelligibility can evaporate altogether when placed side by side with another
line of cases,” and suggesting that applying such an approach to a number of “the Court’s most
important new pronouncements in constitutional law” demonstrates that such cases “cannot be
taken seriously in their own doctrinal terms, but are better understood as part of an antiantidiscrimination agenda”).
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complete abrogation of the rule of law than the Court’s current approach to
determining which instantiations of racial decisionmaking receive favored
treatment: decisions made in secret, in complete contradiction of the
Court’s formally articulated legal rule, and without litigant or other stakeholder input.294 It is time to bring such concerns out in the open and have a
real conversation about which government uses of race should survive.
But how would family law fare under such an explicit regime? Critics
claim that contemporary uses of race in family law rest on racial stereotypes
and have harmed minority and biracial children by privileging race over all
other best interest concerns.295 And such critics have observed that there are
many facial similarities between contemporary race-based practices in
family law and Jim Crow–era practices.296 But others have long contended
that such practices address very real concerns arising from the identity
challenges that minority and biracial children face, and that these practices
are necessary to counteract institutional biases against African American
caregivers.297 And such practices have long had many minority proponents,

294 Cf. Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60 ADMIN L. REV.
647, 654-55 (2008) (describing the consensus elements of the rule of law).
295 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 403-46 (arguing that race matching harms black and
biracial children by depriving them of potential adoptive and foster care homes, as well as causing
a host of other related harms); Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1201-26 (suggesting that race-matching
policies that aim to place children with adoptive parents of the same race tend to result in a
disproportionate delay in or denial of permanent placement for such children); Kim FordeMazrui, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92
MICH. L. REV. 925, 966-67 (1994) (observing that an excessive emphasis on race by courts and
placement agencies can cause serious harm to black children awaiting adoption).
296 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 3-12, 367-73 (describing the historical roots of racematching during the Jim Crow era); Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1175-78 (noting that “near-absolute
barriers to transracial adoption” reflected societal segregation and persisted until at least the end of
the 1950s); cf. Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755, 755-56 (Wash. 1950) (suggesting that, in the context of a
custody dispute, children’s best interests could be best achieved when “brought up among their
own people”). See generally Grossman, supra note 22, at 333-35 (describing problems and questions
posed by interracial adoption in the South in light of its history of hostility toward “interracial
social activity”).
297 See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, The Child’s Best Interests: A Neglected Perspective on Interracial
Intimacies, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2129, 2141-67 (2004) (book review) (arguing that the best interests
of the child should be prioritized, and that such an approach may, in many circumstances, conflict
with a colorblind approach to family law); Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Race Matters in Adoption, 42
FAM. L.Q. 465, 465-69 (2008) (suggesting the “harsh truth” that “African-American children are
not well served” when race is not considered); Nat’l Ass’n of Black Soc. Workers, Preserving
Families of African Ancestry, http://www.nabsw.org/MServer/PreservingFamilies.aspx (last visited
Jan. 24, 2014) (promoting the preservation of families of African ancestry by finding “culturally
grounded options” for African American children before considering placing such children
“outside of the community”).
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although minority communities are by no means monolithic in their
endorsement of contemporary race family law doctrine.298
In short, contemporary uses of race in family law lead to no easy answers.
But it is time for the constitutional conversation to begin.

298 See, e.g., Preserving Families of African Ancestry, supra note 297; see also Bartholet, supra note
199, at 2352-53 (noting the divided opinions in both black and white communities about the
practice of race-matching in adoption).

